Political pressures also build up in the DMU because individuals look for
different attributes from a particular product. This is partly based on the
operational needs of their department. Individuals also pursue their own
self-interest and are motivated by the formal rewards available to them.
Individuals in different areas of the company may be given incentives in
different ways. Buyers may be evaluated and/or given incentives to save
the organisation money. Production managers may be given quality and
output targets. This can lead to strange effects. Bonoma (1982) talks of an
organisation that reduced its list price to well under its competitors, but
gave only small discounts off this list price. All the competitors charged
higher prices but gave larger discounts. Even though the company had
lower prices organisations favoured the competitors. The main reason for
this turned out to be that the buyers were evaluated and given incentives
based on the price concessions they were able to obtain during negoti-
ations rather than on the end price paid.
Figure 4.17 shows how each unit may have its own set of rewards.
These disparate incentives can also lead to conflict within the DMU.
Buyers may feel they cannot save money because the production engin-
eers are setting technical specifications on a product that are too high.
Alternatively production engineers may not be able to reach their output
targets because the buyer has bought a cheaper product from a supplier
who has less dependable delivery times.
Segmentation 75
of finance
department
of production
function
of accounting
function
by others in
the company
of legal
function
of engineering
function
of marketing
function
of purchasing
function
by finance
personnel
by production
personnel
by accounting
personnel
by others in
the company
by legal
personnel
by engineering
personnel
by marketing
personnel
by purchasing
personnel
Figure 4.17
Rewards/incentives as a source of conflict in organisational DMUs (Source: Adapted from
Morris, 1988)