the Islamic ™ijàb. Under Reza Shah’s rule, women,
like other sectors of the society, lost the right to
express themselves and dissent was repressed. Reza
Shah brutally repressed non-Persian ethnic minori-
ties (Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs), nomadic tribal
groups (Bakhtiaris, Qashqais), dissident Shì≠ìclerics,
and Sunnìs. Compliant Shì≠ìclerics were granted
funds to develop seminaries in the city of Qom.
From the 1850s, non-Muslims constituted be-
tween 1 and 4 percent of the population, Sunnìs
between 8 and 10 percent, and Shì≠ìs between 89
and 94 percent (Abrahamian 1982, 12, Limbert
1987, 30). Under Reza Shah Armenians were
viewed with suspicion following their massive par-
ticipation in the Constitutional Revolution and
their general sympathy with progressive forces.
Other non-Muslim religious minorities (Zoroas-
trian, Jewish, and to a lesser extent Assyrian) were
allowed social freedom as long as they did not
engage in politics. However, during the period
1934–41, religious minorities (Bahai, Armenian,
and Assyrian) were targeted for discrimination, and
their schools were closed (Abrahamian 1982, 163).
The period after Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941
until the 1953 coup was the freest period in Iran’s
contemporary history. Various political groups
mobilized workers, women, and ethnic groups. The
August 1953 coup brought to an end a period marked
by extensive civil liberties where all groups –
including women’s, religious, and ethnically-based
groups – were free to publish their political and
ideological perspectives and organize to demand
their rights.
The period 1953 to late 1978 witnessed the
return of Pahlavìauthoritarianism, which com-
bined repressive measures with reforms financed by
oil revenues. The massive oil income in the 1960s
and 1970s allowed mass education, including
higher education for women at unprecedented lev-
els, with a huge increase in women entering into
salaried professions and blue-collar employment.
Despite participation of women in higher educa-
tion and employment in substantial numbers, they
(along with the rest of the society) were not allowed
freedom of expression, or the right to establish
independent journals or groups. Many young uni-
versity women were attracted to left-wing groups,
but in the early 1970s women’s rights were not
prominent as such; they were subsumed under
other guises, either the anti-imperialist struggle or
class demands (Kazemzadeh 2002). The Islamist
groups, by and large, opposed the Shah’s programs
as wholesale importation of Westernized norms
alien to Islamic values and identity. Secular liberal178 freedom of expression
democratic groups emphasized the repression of
individual and political rights by the Shah’s regime.
The anti-Shah movement from early 1977 to
February 1979 included diverse groups. After com-
ing to power, however, Khomeini and his funda-
mentalist allies instituted gender policies that were
resisted by large numbers of women. These strug-
gles revolved around the compulsory ™ijàb, dis-
missal of female judges, dismissal of employed
women, limiting women’s access to higher educa-
tion, and reinstitution of Sharì≠a laws. Feminist,
liberal democratic, and leftist forces publically crit-
icized and resisted the fundamentalist policies until
June 1981, when a violent reign of terror succeeded
in silencing all voices. Mass executions, in the tens
of thousands, crushed all non-fundamentalist forces.
Religious minorities (Sunnì, Bahà±ì, Armenian,
Assyrian, Jewish) lack many civil and political
rights in Iran today. Many religious minorities, par-
ticularly the non-Muslims, left the country after the
1979 revolution in order to escape persecution and
discrimination.
The deteriorating economic conditions, suffocat-
ing cultural environment, and harsh discrimination
against women gave rise to a widespread passive
resistance throughout the 1980s, which eventually
forced the regime to renege on many of its earlier
policies in the 1990s.
In May 1997, a large number of women partici-
pated in the elections and overwhelmingly voted for
Hojatolislam Mohammad Khatami, a reformist
cleric who had promised reduction of repression
and toleration of civil society institutions. His elec-
tion opened a period when dissidents could voice
their ideas, with many becoming increasingly bolder
in their demands and in their criticisms.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
fundamentalist regime has lost its ideological hege-
mony and political legitimacy but not its ability
to coerce and subdue. The proliferation of satellite
television, foreign-based radio broadcasts, and
the Internet have progressively undermined the
regime’s ability to restrict political ideas. The
Internet has enabled the exchange of information
via undetectable email: opponents of the regime can
easily publish articles and photos on the Internet
under pseudonyms. Iranian youth, particularly
young women, have found it safe to write their
views on personal weblogs in Persian. Use of these
new media has allowed increased and undetected
communication and contact between the oppo-
nents of the regime residing abroad with people
living in Iran, but also, more significantly, it has
enabled activists in Iran to meet fellow activists.