Scholars have vigorously criticized these sorts of
reservations as incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty (Mayer 1995b).
Understandings or declarations occur when a
nation states what a certain provision means, usu-
ally for domestic political or legal reasons. Courts
in that country may invoke the understanding to
interpret the treaty. If the government does not
intend the understanding to have effect between it
and other states, it will not be considered a reserva-
tion (Buergenthal and Maier 1990). The end result
is that the understanding or declaration may have
almost the same text as a reservation. In other
words, a Muslim state may make an understanding
that ICCPR article 2 does not require men and
women to have the same opportunities in violation
of Islamic principles, whereas another country would
have called the same statement a reservation.
Since it is well understood that reservations can
undermine the application of a treaty, there are sev-
eral choices one state can make if it does not like the
reservation of another state party. It can do nothing
and just ignore the issue. It can accept that the
reserving state is a party to the convention, but
ignore their reservation. It can object to the reser-
vation as well, which a number of Western states
have done with respect to Islamic countries reser-
vations to CEDAW. For example, Sweden objected
to Egypt’s reservations concerning CEDAW (Mayer
1995b). Alternatively, it can decide that it will not
even acknowledge that the reserving state is a party
to the treaty (art. 20, Vienna Convention). An
objecting state can even take the matter to an inter-
national court like the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) for a ruling. Unfortunately, since the
ICJ and other international tribunals have no effec-
tive police power to implement their decisions, the
opinions can be ignored or flouted much as the
United States flouted the ICJ’s Nicaragua decision
holding the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors to be
a violation of international law. Thus, the embar-
rassment of the large number of reservations to
CEDAW is unlikely ever to be rectified.
While the international level is the place to begin
regarding the implementation of conventions, it is
the national level where real change must then take
place to affect the lives of women. A major problem
that can arise with international agreements is that
even if a state properly ratifies an in-force treaty
with no reservations, it may never follow national
law procedures to implement the treaty, such as
revising existing or passing new legislation. Since
most treaties are not “self-executing,” a lack of
implementing legislation means the treaty is mean-308 international conventions
ingless. For example, article 15(4) of CEDAW says
that “States Parties shall accord to men and women
the same rights with regard to the movement of per-
sons and freedom to choose their residence and
domicile.” Some Muslim countries have customs
and laws that give a husband legal control over his
wife’s or wives’ movements, ranging from the most
restrictive in which a wife needs permission of the
husband even to leave the house to slightly less
restrictive policies on holding a job or traveling out-
side the country. Assuming for the moment that
the country made no reservation on this matter, if
the national law is not amended to bring it into
compliance with CEDAW, then article 15 remains
irrelevant.
Even if the proper legislation is passed, the treaty
may still have no penetrative ability; the branches of
government may make no effort or have limited
capacity to change practices required to implement
the treaty. Using the last example, suppose the
national law is changed and a husband still refuses to
let his wife leave the house. Making the large
assumption that the wife hears about the new law
and manages to leave the house, her efforts to appeal
to the local police or a court are likely to be rebuffed,
as deeply rooted customs and laws are hard to
change in the minds of the enforcers. Of course, the
likelihood that the wife would dare even attempt to
bring a claim under the new law is mooted by the fact
that she, even if illiterate, could properly weigh the
consequences. The sequelae range from being beaten
(which may be legal), to being thrown out of the
house permanently, divorced against her will with no
recourse, left without any financial resources by the
major or sole breadwinner, rejected by her birth fam-
ily who might refuse to then support her, and losing
any access to her children (who remain the legal
property of their father).
Since a country can not be put into a literal
prison, few remedies exist for noncompliance. The
weak remedies available usually include bringing
the matter to the attention of whatever body is cre-
ated to oversee implementation of the treaty. For
example, there is a 23–member CEDAW committee
of experts that meets for only a few weeks a year to
review reports of state parties, make recommenda-
tions, and develop links with other organizations
(arts. 18, 21, 22, CEDAW). The committee is several
years behind in reviewing reports, and many nations
are years behind in submitting their documents,
which may be superficial in nature. The committee
has little ability other than shame to make recalci-
trant governments live up to their obligations.