The Egyptian Zaynab al-Ghazàlì, prior to be-
coming a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood,
formed the Muslim Women’s Society in 1936.
While she emphasized the domestic role as women’s
proper form of participation in jihad, her own
politico-religious endeavors went far beyond this.
During Nasser’s crackdown against Islamists, al-
Ghazàlìhelped organize the Brotherhood to re-
sume its activities, and made “a vow to God to
struggle even to the point of death in the path of His
call.” She also refused to let her husband get in the
way of her “struggle in the path of God,” asking
him to sign an agreement promising his non-inter-
ference. In her prison memoirs, Days From My Life
(1986), she expressly refers to famous warriors
from the time of the Prophet as being role models
(Hoffman 1984).
In the current Islamist “piety movement” in
Egypt, of which the women’s mosque movement is
a part, participants focus on learning Islamic scrip-
tures and proper practice of Islam as part of their
ethical self-fashioning. In their efforts to cultivate
virtuous selves, careful enactment of moral behav-
ior and thought, including modesty, honesty, and
self-willed obedience to religious strictures are
paramount concerns (Mahmood 2003).palestine
Unlike Egyptian Islamists whose jihad has been
geared toward the establishment of an Islamic
state, Palestinian efforts are aimed at ending the
Israeli occupation, and are motivated by a mix of
nationalist and, only for some, religious, concerns.
In this political context, jihad has taken on a mean-
ing that encompasses several notions of struggle:
for land, for country, for freedom, and for religion.
Palestinian women have been involved in politi-
cal and military efforts to block Zionist colonial
settlement since the 1936–9 Arab Revolt led by
Shaykh ≠Izz al-Dìn al-Qassàm, and throughout the
“revolution” in the 1960s when the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization (PLO) began its armed guerilla
movement. Several women became famous for
their military operations, including Layla Khàlid, a
member of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP), and Fatah operative Dalàl al-
Mughrabì, but their involvement in these largely
secular political organizations was not necessarily
framed in terms of jihad. ≠â†if ≠Alyàn, a member of
Islamic Jihad, was arrested before carrying out a
suicide attack using a car bomb in Jerusalem in
1987.
On 27 January 2002, Wafà±Idrìs became the first
of several Palestinian woman to execute what most
Palestinians refer to as a “martyrdom operation,”320 jihad
exploding herself, killing one Israeli and injuring
100 others in Jerusalem. The discourse surrounding
her act, and that of the other women who carried
out similar attacks, included an explicitly gendered
challenge, directed both at Palestinian society and
the international community. The communiqué
issued by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the Fatah-
linked militia that facilitated Idrìs’s bombing,
described her as being “a woman, but worth a
thousand men.” The defiant challenges of their
messages and actions did not, however, disrupt tra-
ditional gender roles. In the video-taped final testi-
mony of female suicide bomber, Ayàt al-Akhras,
she declared that her action was in revenge for
women who had lost their children, and those who
were orphaned. She criticized the Arab leaders for
neglecting Palestine to such an extent that even
Palestinian girls are fighting. Women combatants
such as these are popularly considered martyrs and
heroes, but not always referred to as mujàhidàt.
Another woman suicide bomber, however, Darìn
Abù ≠â±isha, was labeled a mujàhida, and her death
was recognized as being for the sake of God. In her
final note she specifically framed her act as being
part of struggle “in the way of God,” and claimed
for women the right to jihad against oppression,
since women’s role is no less than that of the (male)
mujàhidìn. While some scholars interpret women’s
use of jihad rhetoric as being an excuse and justifi-
cation for what is actually feminist behavior (Cooke
2002, 229), this development in women’s militancy
has not translated into overall shifts in gender roles,
or into women’s greater political participation.
Women’s militant anti-occupation activities have
sparked another level of debate in the ongoing
discussion of the religious legitimacy of suicide
bombings. Shaykh Yùsuf al-Qara∂àwì, a leading
Egyptian Muslim scholar, and president of the
European Council for Fatwa and Research, de-
clared that martyrdom operations are the highest
form of jihad. While other Islamic scholars echoed
his opinion, it was not a universally held ruling
among muftis. As for women’s participation, Shaykh
al-Qara∂àwìalso declared that this is permitted,
because when the enemy attacks part of the Muslim
territories, jihad becomes an individual duty of
all. Woman can participate in this form of jihad
“according to her own means and condition.”
Qara∂àwì’s fatwa included strategic reasoning when
he maintained that women could carry out attacks
and reach places that men could not. This recalls
the emergence of mujàhidàt, women militants of
the Algerian Revolution who became heroines in
the 1960s for transporting bombs in their dresses,
thus evading French capture (Moghadam 2003).