ization of women, and other realities inherent in
the conflation of patriarchy and state.
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Diane E. Kingthe ottoman empire 349The Ottoman EmpireThe Ottoman Empire included diverse ethnic and
religious groups that adhered to a variety of kinship
practices. To establish legitimacy and power over
these groups, the Ottomans regularly co-opted
kinship units of the different populations into the
organization of the Ottoman state. For example,
rival Turkish and Arab tribal groups and leaders
were often given regional powers within the Otto-
man state apparatus. This tactic allowed the Otto-
man Empire to expand its boundaries and its
sovereignty over people and resources, even as each
of the various ethnic groups was able to maintain a
fair amount of autonomy within their respective
territories. While the relationship between kinship
and state in the Ottoman era is a complex topic,
this entry focuses specifically on how the Ottoman
dynasty of the classical era (1300–1600) used
kinship discourse to help consolidate its power
and legitimate itself as the dynasty whose right to
rule was mandated by Turkish tradition and by
association with the Prophet Mu™ammad. This
resort to kinship to justify positions of power dif-
ferentially implicated women in the Ottoman
dynasty, depending on the context of the legitimat-
ing discourse.
Early in its history the Ottoman dynasty’s right to
rule over the numerous territories and peoples
of Anatolia was repeatedly contested by various
rivals. After the Seljuk Turkish sultanate of Anato-
lia crumbled during the thirteenth century, Mongol
invaders and various Turkmen tribes competed for
control of the Anatolian lands; the Ottoman tribe
emerged as dominant by the end of the fourteenth
century. In 1395 the Ottoman ruler Bayezid I sought
to reinforce political supremacy in Anatolia by peti-
tioning the ≠Abbàsid emperor for the official title of
Íultàn al-Rùm (ruler of the Byzantine territories),
which was a designation that had traditionally
belonged to the Seljuk rulers. But the Mongol
leader Tamerlane and his successor Çahruh coun-
tered the Ottoman drive for dominance by laying
claim to all former Mongol territories in Anatolia
gained during the Mongol invasion of the thir-
teenth century. To frustrate this challenge, the
Ottomans produced a long, largely fabricated,
genealogy connecting the Ottoman lineage to the
ancient and glorious Turkish khans of Central Asia,
who were extolled as gazileaders – that is, warriors
in the service of jihad. Early Turkish historians
claimed that Osman I (ca. 1299–1324), the founder
of the Ottoman Empire, was descended directly
from the legendary O©uz Khàn, and that an as-
sembly of Turkish beys of the frontier had formally