time that it is ambiguous. We are free and
accepting of our submission; we subject our-
selves. In so doing we are allowed to forget the
reality of being subjected to different ideological
systems. In Althusser’s terms, ideology repre-
sents ‘not the system of the real relations which
govern the existence of individuals, but the
imaginary relation of those individuals to the real
conditions in which they live’ (1971: 165). Stuart
Hall (1985) puts it more clearly when he argues
that ‘the problem is how to account for the fact
that in the realm of ideas and meaning men can
“experience” themselves in ways which do not
fully correspond to their real situation’. In other
words, what may seem intensely intimate and
personal really is nothing more than a subject
position we hold in relation to a larger system.
The important point is that the subjectivities
that we build up in our practices of subjection
are important to us as individuals. Another
important consideration flowed from his theory.
In Hall’s (1985) famous statement, Althusser
lets us live with difference. While I won’t follow
through on Hall’s intricate argument, what I
want to draw out is the fact that Althusser’s
theory can be used to think about how different
spheres of subjectivity are enacted, more often
than not by one individual. While it has become
fashionable to talk about all subjectivity as frag-
mented, this can ignore the ways we are inter-
pellated and inhabit sometimes quite conflicting
subjectivities. For instance, if I am a gay male
school teacher, my subjectivities will probably
not be seamless. I will feel parts of my subjec-
tivity in different contexts. Given the general
homophobia of our culture, as a gay man I
would be interpellated by the educational
system as a ‘bad’ subject, even though I may be
deeply invested in being a ‘good teacher’. To
return to the crucial point about the spatial con-
figurations of subjectivities, we proceed from
the basic idea that subjectivities are not abstract
entities; they are always conducted in situ. They
are also hard-won.
Teresa de Lauretis’ (1988) argument about
‘technologies of gender’ is one of the most use-
ful takes on Althusser’s theory of ideology. Fol-
lowing Althusser, she also insists that ideology
works fundamentally by means of its engage-
ment of subjectivity. De Lauretis extends the
scope of Althusser’s argument by replacing ‘ide-
ology’ with ‘gender’. Her objective is to con-
ceive of a new kind of subject, one that operates
through gender, as in fact we all do in ‘real life’.
De Lauretis’ proposal for thinking subjectivity
centres on ‘a subject constituted in gender
though not by sexual difference alone, but rather
across languages and cultural representations; asubject en-gendered in the experiencing of race
and class, as well as sexual, relations; a subject,
therefore, not unified but multiple, and not so
much divided as contradicted’ (1988: 1). Here
again we hear the emphasis on subjectivity as the
‘product and process’ of practices. But contrary
to Althusser’s subject in ideology who cannot
recognize himself as within ideology, de Lauretis
argues that feminism, or the critical study of the
ideology of gender, produces a subject who is
aware of the workings of ideology. The subject,
she argues, ‘within feminism is one that is at the
same time inside andoutside the ideology of
gender, and conscious of being so, conscious of
that two-fold pull, of that division, of that dou-
bled vision’ (1988: 10).
De Lauretis argues that this is an uncomfort-
able position, but a necessary one. If we recall
that one of the contentions of Althusser’s
description of ideology was that living within the
system allowed for a sense that everything was
alright, we can see that being inside and outside
ideology would be disturbing. But precisely one
of the important differences between Althusser
and feminist arguments like de Lauretis’ is the
acknowledgement that everyday life throws up
moments that intrude upon our senses of our-
selves. Simply put, Althusser describes at a
theoretical level how ideology as a system might
work. De Lauretis, on the other hand, shuttles
between ‘life’ and theory.
‘Life’ provides us with a critical entrance into
theorizing subjectivity. De Lauretis uses a cine-
matic term, the space-off, to describe aspects of
life that are outside the frame of dominant dis-
courses. Consider the following quotation where
she describes ‘the space-off’, ‘the space not visi-
ble in the frame but inferable from what the
frame makes visible’ (1988: 26):[I]t is here [in the space-off] that the terms of a differ-
ent construction of gender can be posed – terms that do
have effect and take hold at the level of subjectivity and
self-representation: in the micro-political practices of
daily life and daily resistances that afford both agency
and sources of power or empowering investments.
(1988: 25)For de Lauretis those micro-practices can be as
diverse as feminist cultural representations or
political practices that bring together ‘the per-
sonal and the political’. To return to Althusser’s
description of being hailed or interpellated on the
street by the police, we could also envision being
interpellated by the sight of a woman on the
street with a black eye, or a woman begging with
her children. If we make the move to consider
how these individual cases link to broader ques-
tions about domestic violence, or the povertyTHE SPATIAL IMPERATIVE OF SUBJECTIVITY 2933029-ch14.qxd 03-10-02 10:54 AM Page 293