Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Preface - Preface

(Steven Felgate) #1

Learning
Returning to Benson (1972), i fwe want the past to serve the future, we cannot
treat it in isolation. The rules we use to explain the past must also be those we
use to predict the future. We must cumulate our experience with a careful eye
to all relevant tests o four hypotheses. One aspect o fdoing this is compiling
records that can be subjected to systematic statistical analysis: A second is
keeping track o fthe deliberations preceding our own decisions, realizing that
the present will soon be past and that a well-preserved record is the best rem-
edy to hindsight bias: A third is making predictions that can be evaluated; one
disturbing lesson from the Three Mile Island nuclear accident is that it is not
entirely clear what that ostensibly diagnostic event told us about the validity
o fthe Reactor Sa fety Study (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975) that
attempted to assess the risks from nuclear power: A fourth aspect is getting a
better idea o fthe validity o four own feelings o fconfidence, inso far as confi-
dence in present knowledge controls our pursuit o fnew in formation and
interpretations (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). Thus, we should struc-
ture our lives so as to facilitate learning.


Indeterminacy
In the end, though, there may be no answers to many o fthe questions we are
posing. Some are ill-formed. Others just cannot be answered with existing or
possible tools. As much as we would like to know ‘‘how the pros do it,’’ there
may be no way statistically to model experts’ judgmental policies to the desired
degree o fprecision with realistic stimuli. Our theories are o ften o f‘‘such com-
plexity that no single quantitative work could even begin to test their validity’’
(O’Leary et al., 1974, p. 228). When groups we wish to compare on one variable
also differ on another, there is no logically sound procedure for equating them
on that nuisance variable (Meehl, 1970). When we have tried many possible
explanations on a fixed set o fdata, there is no iron-clad way o fknowing just
how many degrees o f freedom we have used up, just how far we have cap-
italized on chance (Campbell, 1975). When we use multiple approaches, the
knowledge they produce never converges neatly. In the end, we may have to
adopt Trevelyan’s philosophical perspective that ‘‘several imperfect readings of
history are better than none at all’’ (cited in Marwick, 1970, p. 57).


Notes


This is a revised version o fthe paper ‘‘For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Reflections on
Historical Judgment,’’ in R. A. Shweder and D. W. Fiske (Eds.),New Directions for Methodology
of Behavioral Science: Fallible Judgment in Behavioral Research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980.
Reprinted by permission.



  1. To standardize scores on a particular variable, one subtracts the mean o fall scores from each
    score and then divides by the standard deviation. The result is a set o fscores with a mean o f0
    and a standard deviation o f1.

  2. One o fmy favorite contrasts is that when the market rises following good economic news, it is
    said to be responding to the news; i fit falls, that is explained by saying that the good news had
    already been discounted.

  3. A friend once took a course in reading form charts from a local brokerage. Each session involved
    the teaching o f10–12 new cues. When the course ended, five sessions and 57 cues later, the in-
    structor was far from exhausting his supply.


634 Baruch Fischhoff

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