Toyota Way Fieldbook : A Practical Guide for Implementing Toyota's 4Ps

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the emphasis was on factory layout. Specific designs for process equip-
ment were outsourced to suppliers who took primary responsibility
for the equipment designed and did not have close interaction with
the product designers.
The early promise of a truly integrated design and manufacturing
system was not realized. And there was little integration between the
primary functional groups (including Procurement and Supply—a
large majority of component suppliers also inherited primary design
responsibility for components/systems). Teams would review packag-
ing issues, often only within functional areas (e.g., Body Engineering),
and start the process very late (long after design freeze). The result
was an inordinate amount of late discovery and change to both process
and components, delaying product launches and leading to a long
ramp-up time. In addition, there was little focus placed on developing
an integrated cross-functional design review process (simultaneous
engineering). The priority was placed on developing the technology, and
progress became stalled despite the advancements made in software.
In 2000, a team of new employees was recruited from Toyota’s North
American operations to support quality improvements as a part of an
effort to turn around AmCar, which at that time was losing money and
struggling with severe quality problems and warranty costs. One of the
Toyota employees who had experience managing product launches
immediately noticed there was little activity in using computer simula-
tions to anticipate manufacturing problems in the product development
stage. Toyota called these “digital build” simulations. The car was, in
a sense, built on the computer virtually, and cross-functional teams
carefully evaluated problems in manufacturing and assembling the car,
using Toyota’s rigorous problem-solving methodology.
In late 2001 the Toyota TTC (Toyota Technical Center, Ann Arbor)
participated in a joint technology sharing session with AmCar. Toyota
representatives were surprised at the lack of advancement in digital
design—a benchmarking session conducted in the late 1990s led
Toyota to believe that AmCar was advancing rapidly in this arena.
Toyota indicated that this activity was a key enabler in reducing their
overall development lead time.
In early 2002 another more detailed gap analysis resulted in the recom-
mendation by AmCar senior management to pursue the simultaneous
engineering (SE) and digital assembly (DA) process. To support this, in
2002 a more stringent issues-management process was implemented,
along with intense pressure to complete design/process freezes, valida-
tion activities, and overall product/process changes much earlier (using
Toyota processes for each item). The groundwork was being developed
to increase the level of discipline required to support SE and DA.

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