hinduism with others. 293
fronted with hateful words and hostile attitudes; but many cases of hurt result from
insufficient recognition of how others are intimidated by our (real or perceived)
power. Impatience with the other’s emotional and intellectual uncertainties does
nothing to promote mutual understanding in a plural world, and the last of our
queries focuses on the realities of that plural world.
Fourth, we query the claim of any single ideology, including liberalism, to be the
sole and incontestable ideology of interpretation. Rather, we are committed to ex-
ploring the tensions between liberalism and pluralism. The dominant academic/crit-
ical ideology of Hindus and non-Hindus alike is liberalism, which is not pluralistic
but emphasizes certain values, in particular the concept of “free” inquiry and speech,
without constraints on the individual. Exclusive liberalism is committed to the re-
jection of values and symbols that do not conform to its own; indeed, it asks for their
defeat.^6 The exclusively liberal study of Hinduism typically wishes to subject values
such as the psychological reality of existential faith-commitments, religious sym-
bolism, and emotional identity to the unrestricted scrutiny of putatively uncommit-
ted disciplinary analysis. As we know, this ideology has led to conflict between schol-
ars and adherents.
To put it another way, the study of Hinduism is forced to partake in the peren-
nial paradox of liberalism. It must insist on tolerance and inclusion of others’ reli-
gious voices even as it argues with those religious voices that are not tolerant.
Wendy Steiner describes this paradox as follows:
In a state controlled by fundamentalist ideas a liberal cannot speak, but in a state con-
trolled by liberal ideas a fundamentalist cannot act. The ideas of a fundamentalist are
exclusionary and performative, i.e., valid only when turned into actions; an article
of faith is not a mere topic of discussion to the believer. Thus, the liberal, in insist-
ing on tolerance, is insisting on not only his idea but his practice. In the considerable
commentary about the Rushdie affair in America, the absolute value of tolerance or
free speech emerges as a point of dogmatic blindness for some and a logical embar-
rassment for others. Leon Wieseltier states without irony, “Let us be dogmatic about
tolerance,” but for Norman Mailer the issue is not so easy: “We believe in freedom
of expression as an absolute. How dangerous to use the word absolute.”^7The scholar of Hinduism insists, and has traditionally insisted, that everyone
must practice tolerance even as his or her analytic categories of study imply judg-
ment. Liberalism is often confronted with an antipluralistic inner reflex when it at-
tempts to control and contain challenges to its views. And the practical implication