whole, ambiguous rather than clear, and interrupted rather than complete’ and it may
be that here the feminine form is ‘without a sense of formal closure [and] without
closure the sense of beginning, middle and end as a central form, it abandons the
hierarchical organising principles... that served to elide women from discourse’ (Case
1998: 129).
25 Thus Lefebvre argued that ‘Western philosophy had abandoned the living body as the
store of non-formal knowledge (non-savoir) which constitutes a source of potential
knowledge (connaissance)’ (Kofman and Lebas 1995: 32), in part because it had split
time from space:
in social practice, scientific knowledge and philosophical speculation, an ancient
tradition separates time and space like two entities or clearly distinct substances.
This in spite of contemporary themes which show a relationship between time and
space, or more precisely, express how they are relating to each other. Despite these
theories, in the social sciences one continues to split time between lived time,
measured time, historical time, work and leisure time and daily time, etc., which
usually are studied outside their spatial framework. Now concrete theories have
rhythms, or rather, are rhythms and every rhythm implies the relation of time with
a space, a localised time, or if one wishes, a temporalised place. Rhythm is always
linked to such and such a place, to its place, whether it be the heart, the fluttering
of the eyelids, the movement of a street, or the tempo of a waltz. This does not
prevent it from being a time, that is an aspect of a moment and a becoming.
(Lefebvre 1995: 230)As Gregory (199 7 ) points out, Lefebvre’s thoughts on psychoanalysis were in part
stimulated by a desire to stand against Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory through the
deployment of a cartographic sensibility (and subjectivity) which could detect those
rhythms ‘whose existence is signalled only through mediations, through indirect effects
of manifestations’ (Lefebvre 1991: 205).
26 Though Gane (1993) quite rightly notes the gender imbalance of so many of these
partnerships what surprises Chadwick and de Courtivron (1993: 7 ) is that they often
generate ‘multiple creativities’ which can ‘provide us with a renewed sense of wonder
at the endless complexities of partnership itself’.
27
Dewey wanted philosophers to see that nondiscursive experience could be used to
enrich knowledge, not just the ‘felt’ quality of living. That such experience had no
value for philosophy’s favourite cognitive goal of epistemological justification did
not mean that it had no other cognitive value. A better measured sense of breathing
could provide a calmer, better measured process of thought; an ineffable flush of
energetic evaluation could spur one to think beyond habitual limits.
(Shusterman 199 7 : 16 7 )28 Such views as Foucault professes are not so far removed, as Shusterman (199 7 ) notes,
from those of Emerson and Thoreau for which ‘intellectual tasting of life will not
supersede muscular activity’ (Emerson 19 4 2: 236).
29 One of the remarkable ironies of contemporary life is that these kinds of thoughts are
best recognized by modern business theorists, and are beginning to be applied (cf.
Krogh and Roos 1995; see also George 1998). For example, Krogh and Roos (1995)
take what they call an ‘anti-representationist’ perspective which is more relevant to
practice by rejecting some of the assumptions of the cognitivist perspective and instead
emphasizing the embodied, autopoetic perspective of Maturana and Varela.
Notes 269