Knowing the World 85not have this urge. If other things confront them, no ques-
tions arise. Other things remain external to such beings.
For thinking beings, a concept arises from the encounter
with an external thing. The concept is that part of a thing
that we do not receive from without, but from within.
Knowledge, cognitionis meant to accomplish the balance
or union of the two elements, inner and outer.
A percept, then, is not something finished or closed off.
It is one side of the total reality. The other side is the con-
cept. The act of knowing (cognition) is the synthesis of
percept and concept. Only percept and concept together
make up the whole thing.
The preceding discussion demonstrates that it is mean-
ingless to look for any common element among the
world’s individual entities other than the conceptual con-
tent presented by thinking. Any attempt to find a world
unity other than this self-consistent conceptual content—
which we gain by thinking contemplation of our per-
cepts—must fail. For us, neither a human, personal God,
nor force, nor matter, nor even the idealess will (Schopen-
hauer) can be considered the universal element of the
world. All these entities belong merely to a limited area of
our observation. We perceive a humanly limited personal-
ity only in ourselves; force and matter only in external
things. As for the will, it can be seen only as an expression
of our limited personality’s activity. Schopenhauer wants
to avoid making “abstract” thinking the bearer of the uni-
versal world element, and instead seeks something that
presents itself to him immediately as real. This philosopher
believes that we misjudge the world if we see it as external: