The Idea of Freedom 147of pleasure associated with it. For such a person, then, it
is a distinct moral principle in addition to the previous
one.
The principle of the welfare of all, like that of the
progress of civilization, depends on a mental picture; that
is to say, on the relationship that we make between the
content of ethical ideas and particular experiences (per-
cepts). But the highest ethical principle of which we can
think is that which contains no such relationshipin ad-
vance, but rather springs from the source of pure intu-
ition and only afterward seeks a relationship to a percept
(to life). Here, the determination ofwhat is to be willed
proceeds from a different source than in the previous ex-
amples. Those who honor the ethical principle of the
good of all will, in all their actions, ask first what their
ideals contribute to that good. Those who adhere to the
ethical principle of the progress of civilization will do the
same. Yet there is a higher way that does not proceed
from one definite, single ethical goal in each case, but as-
sumes a certain value to all ethical maxims and in each
case asks whether one or the other moral principle is more
important. In certain circumstances, I might regard pro-
motion of cultural progress as right and make it into the
motive of my action; in others, promotion of the good of
the whole; and in a third case, promotion of my own wel-
fare. But, if all other reasons determining action move to
second place, then conceptual intuition itself has primary
consideration. The other motives now step down from the
leading position, and the ideal content of the action alone
operates as its motive.