to break through old gestalts in the theory of types, had an inkling of the impor-
tance of symbolism in Wittgenstein’s breakthrough (Russell, 1967: 228–229, 247).
Referring to Wittgenstein’s notion of unsayability, in the introduction to the Trac-
tatus (Russell, 1922: xvii–xviii) Russell says: “This view may have been originally
suggested by notation, and if so, that is much in its favor, for a good notation has
a subtlety and suggestiveness which at times makes it seem almost like a live
teacher. Notational irregularities are often the first sign of philosophical errors, and
a perfect notation would be a substitute for thought.”- Frege had already shown the way in pointing out that his distinction between
asserting a function and the content asserted—a predecessor of the hierarchic
theory of types—reveals the error in Anselm’s ontological proof. - “Vienna Circle” is a loose term for an entire movement. In the narrower sense, the
circle was the personal seminar conducted by Schlick from 1924 to 1936; as
the movement grew, it became formalized through the leadership of Neurath with
its manifesto in 1929 and its own journal, Erkenntnis, in 1930 (Ayer, 1982;
Popper, 1976; Quine, 1985; Waismann, 1979; Johnston, 1972). Overlapping were
other sub-factions and discussion groups, as well as a pared-down circle of those
Wittgenstein allowed to meet with him during 1927–1932. These circles are
interconnected by visitors with the Berlin circle of Reichenbach, and with the
Warsaw school of logicians; another node at Prague via the physicist Philip Frank,
becoming more central when Carnap gets a chair there in 1931; and in the 1930s
a widening network of young philosophers who spread the message abroad: from
Oxford, Ryle’s pupil Ayer; from Harvard, Whitehead’s and C. S. Lewis’s pupil (and
thereby James’s grandpupil) Quine. - Schnädelbach (1984: 87); Willey (1978: 155, 173); Johnston (1972: 189). Vaihin-
ger began to formulate his doctrine in the 1870s after studying with the militant
Neo-Kantian Lange. Vaihinger was strongly identified with Kantian scholarship;
he founded the journal Kant Studien in 1896 and the Kant Society in 1904, the
major channels for the proliferation of Kantian publications at the turn of the
century. It was in this journal that Schlick delivered his attack on Cassirer’s
Neo-Kantian physics in 1921. The Vienna Circle journal Erkenntnis was a succes-
sor to another of Vaihinger’s journals, Annalen der Philosophie. - Coffa (1991: 189–201). Einstein overthrew Newtonian space as an absolute con-
tainer of motion; as late as 1920, Reichenbach regarded Einstein’s argument as
providing support for Neo-Kantianism. Einstein himself came to dislike the Neo-
Kantian interpretation, holding instead that time-space has physically objective
existence. In 1921 Einstein wrote to Schlick in support of the latter’s critique of
Cassirer’s interpretation of relativity theory. But Einstein’s opinion was hardly
decisive for the changing philosophical atmosphere. His own sympathies were
mixed and highly variable (Holton, [1973] 1988: 237–278). Early (around 1905)
Einstein regarded himself as sympathetic to Machian phenomenalism, though
drawing crucial components from Planck’s opposing position; in the 1910s he
shifted toward theory-accessible realism; by 1922—just after his contact with
Schlick—he was publicly attacking the Machians as overly empiricist. When the
1016 •^ Notes to Pages 717–720