the imperial librarian Liu Hsin; his network of teachers descended from Liu
An, the prince of Huai Nan himself (see Figure 4.3). Structurally the old
anti-Confucian opposition continued in the new opposition within Confucian-
ism. Liu Hsin was joined by contemporary Confucian dissidents Yang Hsiung
and Huan T’an, anti-occultist skeptics with connections to the mathematical
and other scientific work around this time.^14 Two generations later, the most
radically secularist, anti-teleological Confucian appeared: Wang Ch’ung. This
was a period of two-sided struggle rather than a swing in the zeitgeist away
from occultism. It was in these same generations that the movement to deify
Confucius was at its height.^15
The struggle gave rise to little sustained creativity in Chinese philosophy.
Figure 4.3 shows how sparse and broken were the networks of notable figures;
little reflexive abstraction built up. On the level of political realities, both the
New Text and Old Text schools were tied to external allies, whose dynastic
political struggles they bolstered with rival prophecies from occult numerology
and portents (Gernet, 1982: 163–165). Even the most extreme of the “ration-
alist” anti-occultists, such as Wang Ch’ung, did little more than to lay down
a negative position, implicitly linked to the occultism which constitutes its
topic.^16 Confucian religion and Confucian rationalism set the lines of long-
standing internal opposition within Confucianism, in effect a division over the
question of how much the scholars should mingle in the external politics of
religious-political factionalism. It was an opposition on a low level of intellec-
tual abstraction, anchored in the external world, promoting little autonomy
for inner developments in intellectual space.
The Changing Landscape of External Supports
The Han dynasty, especially in its earlier period, aimed at a totally controlling
bureaucratic state, attempting to regulate the entire economy, providing public
works, monopolizing manufactures and their distribution. Armies consisted of
conscripts armed and supplied by the state. The predominance of a civilian
bureaucracy gave some basis for intellectual life, in the bureau of religious rites
and the imperial library, and an educationally credentialed profession of higher
administrators provided some positions for teachers. We have seen the limita-
tions on intellectual life under these conditions. Most officials—there were
120,000 of them by 100 c.e. (CHC, 1986: 466)—were narrowly concerned
with practicality or with political maneuvering; much of the innovativeness
around the bureau of rites took the form of particularistic cults, including
divinization of Confucius. The expansion of the state university, which reached
30,000 students by 125–144 (CHC, 1986: 756–757), was not associated with
philosophical creativity. We see again in later dynasties, especially the T’ang
158 •^ Intellectual Communities: Asian Paths