stances. Even unmanifested karma is regarded as a type of matter. This omni-
realism probably developed from epistemological argument. The Sarvastivad-
ins held that no true cognition is possible without a real object; if past and
future did not exist, nor any of the non-substantial dharmas, we could not
cognize them (Conze, 1962: 137–141; Guenther, 1972: 43–47, 65).
Now there emerged lines of genuine philosophical disagreement among the
Buddhists. The Sarvastivadins, centered in Kashmir, underwent a schism of
their branch in Gandhara which become the Sautrantikas, those who reject the
Abhidharma and claim to return to the sutras. The Sautrantikas rejected the
doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness by which the Sarvastivadins
defended their realism. Instead, they distinguished between the things of expe-
rience, which exist but only as transitory point-instants of space-time; and
non-concrete categories, which do not exist; the latter are permanent and real
but only as abstractions. There is a non-referential aspect of mind whereby
dharmas which are not existing substances can be objects of valid cognition.
The Sautrantikas were phenomenalists about the world, nominalists about
general categories. Whereas the Sarvastivadins held that dependent origination
is an interlocking net of simultaneously existing causal elements, the Sautran-
tikas were the first to emphasize that there is no causality except in temporal
sequences. The world, although independently existing, is a flux of evanescent
instantaneous beings (Guenther, 1972: 75–76).
Another variant, the Kashyapiyas, tried to pare down the scope of depend-
ent origination. Taking another stance in the array opened up by the Sarvasti-
vadins, they held that only that part of the past exists which continues to have
an effect on the present, and only that part of the future exists which is inherent
in the present. The Sarvastivada-Sautrantika split, sometimes referred to as the
seventh Buddhist schism, came near the end of the period of division of the
old Buddhist sects, around 100 b.c.e. These philosophical positions were to
be the background from which emerged the critical philosophy of Nagarguna.
- Meanwhile, the other major branch of Buddhist sectarianism, the Ma-
hasanghika, was also subdividing. Some of the subsects were developing philo-
sophical positions. The Vetulyakas (around the time of the third schism, ca.
300 b.c.e.) held that nothing has its own nature, but instead all the elements
are void (shunya). This has the ring of a direct opposition to the Sarvastivadins,
and also foreshadows Nagarjuna. The Uttarapathakas (in the fourth or fifth
schism) interpreted each element not as void, but not as determinate either in
the sense of the Sarvastivadin realism; instead each thing was said to have its
own-nature (tathata, or “thusness”), an inexplicable indexicality which brings
to the fore the radical particularity of existence. Around the same time, a
branch known as the Andhakas took a more radical departure from Buddhist
tradition by moving toward a form of idealism. The objects of mind were held
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