Gaudapada, Mandana, and Shankara now invade the monist side, and they
do so with Buddhist conceptual tools, apparently acquired by direct contact
with the Buddhist camp. Institutionally dying, Buddhism falls open for scav-
enging by its enemies. Both its sophisticated dialectic and its distinctive ontol-
ogy provide the basis for its successors on the Hindu side of the field.
Mimamsa as Reactionary Radicalism. Let us consider first the Mimamsa
revolution, then the Advaita hyper-revolution. Mimamsa began as a narrow
technical specialty of exegesis of the old Vedas, discussing doubtful points
(mimamsante) in the performance of sacrifices; it continued the activity of those
who had composed the Brahmanas, and scorned the abstract discussions of
the Upanishadic intellectuals (Chattopadhyaya, 1979: 1:157–161, 188). The
Mimamsakas acquired a philosophical identity as their opposition to other
Brahmanical schools became more acute. They held the most conservative side,
claiming that the Brahman’s role was purely that of professional ritualist.
Nevertheless, as they were drawn into the intellectual discussion space, defense
of their externally conservative stance drove Mimamsa into internally quite
radical innovations. It is a common dialectic of intellectual history; we see it
again in the socially reactionary but intellectually radical Neo-Confucians of
Sung China, the innovative “Ancient Learning” and “National Learning”
schools of Tokugawa Japan, and the anti-Enlightenment and anti-positivist
philosophers of modern Europe. In the case of India, we have proof that a
self-conscious ideology favoring innovation is not necessary for creativity;
adulation of an allegedly eternal tradition can be creative, since tradition itself
is always interpreted by the present. Constituted as part of a field of forces, as
the oppositions change, conservatives cannot but change as well.
The early Mimamsakas developed the self-promoting ideology that the old
Vedas were the final authority; to bolster it, they theorized that the sounds
which make up the text are eternal. In reaction to theistic worship in non-sac-
rificial and non-Brahman cults, the Mimamsakas became strident atheists.
Shabara, the first commentator on the Mimamsa sutras (ca. 200 c.e., contem-
porary with the crystallization of Hindu law and the other philosophical
schools), argued that gods are mere names, mantra sounds made in rituals
(Chattopadhyaya, 1979: 1:206). By the time of Kumarila, the argument was
expanded to deny that God created the world, since the world is eternal, and
a transcendent, undifferentiated God would have no motive for creating any-
thing, let alone a world of imperfections and miseries; and to deny the value
of salvation, since this could consist in nothing but a stone-like unconscious-
ness without enjoyment (Raju, 1985: 58–61). Furthermore, the purpose of
religious sacrifices is to bring worldly wealth and pleasure; ethical behavior is
no substitute for this way of accumulating a store of merits.
The early Mimamsaka “Jaimini” (possibly mythical, between 200 b.c.e.
External and Internal Politics: India • 243