(and the related issue of the createdness of the QurÁan), led to consideration
of substance and attributes. The combination of these two issues generated a
new intellectual space. Muslim philosophers began to compete for attention
by innovating over their own problems. By taking apart the notions first of
attributes, then of substance, they arrived at the doctrine of atomism. At this
point a true intellectual competition existed. Islamic philosophy swung free
from being a mere reflex of political positions and onto an autonomous path.
Fueled at first by theological energies, the philosophical arguments became
more subtle. The Aristotelean concepts of substance and accident were sub-
jected to scrutiny in the generation just before 800. At Basra, Dirar ibn ÀAmr
rejected the notion of substance; he held that a body is a collection of accidents,
arranged in a hierarchy; once constituted, an accident may become the sub-
stratum of other accidents (Fakhry, 1983: 53; Watt, 1973: 194–195). Perhaps
Dirar’s contemporary Hisham ibn al-Hakam (22 in the key to Figure 8.1) had
driven him to this position; Hisham held that there is no distinction of sub-
stance and accident, since every substance is divisible ad infinitum. Hisham
was an avowed anthropomorphist, defending the literal descriptions of God
in the QurÁan; since attributes (or accidents) were at issue, he was willing to
reduce everything to an attribute. Some of the MuÀtazilites (e.g., 30 in Figure
8.1) adopted the same position. Substance was dissolving; out of this came the
distinctive MuÀtazilite metaphysics, time-atomism.
Dirar was also struggling for a way to defend free will; he held that God
controls what happens in the outer world, but man, not God, acquires the
moral responsibility by inward assent or dissent (Fakhry, 1983: 48–49). Dirar’s
solution was apparently controversial among his contemporaries, for he was
attacked as a determinist. He held that there is no bodily substance but only
accidents, and these cannot exist for two successive moments; this implied that
they are continuously re-created by God. This is the first mention of time-at-
oms, as yet applied only to attributes rather than substances.
A rival stance was taken by another Basra theologian, MuÀammar. Far from
eliminating substance, MuÀammar held that God brought about the original
existence of bodies by creating the atoms they are composed of (Wolfson, 1976:
158, 560–576; Peters, 1968: 144). Accidents are caused in turn by the aggre-
gation of bodily atoms. God thus causes accidents only indirectly, and is not
responsible for their good or evil qualities. For MuÀammar, man is an imma-
terial, knowledgeable substance connected to the body. Free will exists only
inwardly; the body is part of the external world, subject to the necessity of
nature. It is a dualism not unlike Descartes’s.
So far, Dirar has no atomic substance but only attributes which are tem-
poral atoms. MuÀammar has atomic substances, although they are not time-
atoms, but are permanent once created by God. The next generation appears
Tensions of Ideas: Islam, Judaism, Christendom^ •^399