We have now to consider the causes of the epistemology-metaphysics
sequence. Three analytically distinct, sometimes historically overlapping causes
are discernible: (1) skepticism as a catalyst (among the classic counter-moves
it provokes is the cogito); (2) the sheer intensity and continuity of debate,
resulting in epistemological reflexivity; and (3) the epistemological tensions
produced by anthropomorphic monotheism.
skepticism as catalyst
An early and recurrent form of contested epistemology occurs in the form of
skepticism. One way in which this arises is that the intellectual attention space
is overcrowded: multiple factions violate the upper limits of the law of small
numbers, and there is a chaotic sense of lack of clear positions. Not only is
there no agreement on what is true, but even the alternatives are muddy.^10
Skepticism emerges in times of rapid expansion of the intellectual commu-
nity at venues for multi-sided debate. Athens at the time of the Sophists, when
all the networks converged and the level of competition over the originality of
ideas was at its height, is one famous case. In the following generations, this
skepticism was raised to the level of a school with Pyrrho and Timon. Another
case is India in the late Upanishadic period, with the inchoate breakdown of
Vedic schools and the multiple sects of the shramanas. Some critical positions
deny karma, others deny morality. The Buddha’s contemporary Sañjaya was a
full-fledged skeptic, denying knowledge in general. Yet another parallel is
China during the late Warring States, when centers such as the Chi-hsia
Academy promoted a network of “the hundred schools.” Specialists in debate
appear who argue on both sides of a question; the style of paradoxical argu-
ment became famous from Hui Shih down through the Tao Te Ching. In the
crucial founding periods for these three great regional traditions, the center of
attention was disturbed by expounders of paradoxes and claims that truth does
not exist.^11
Militant skepticism proclaims the intellectual community as a whole a dead
end. Nevertheless, skepticism arises only in an oppositional field of forces. It
is striking that opponents are never convinced by skeptical arguments, nor
derailed from continuing their positions. Skepticism is one faction among many
within an array of oppositions; it is parasitical on its enemies, and dies out
with them. The skepticism of Arcesilaus’ Academy was tied to refutation of
the Old Stoics, and disappeared with the changing doctrine of its opponents
(Reale, 1985: 334).
Skepticism is a step in the sequence of oppositions driving toward higher
levels of abstraction. The Greek Sophists were followed by the emergence of
explicit epistemological standards with Socrates and Plato. The debating stance
was institutionalized in a dialectical logic by the Megarian school, followed by
Sequence and Branch in the Social Production of Ideas^ •^811