to perform this role. Cambodia turned to China when both its power-
ful neighbours were allies of the US. In providing some guarantee
of Cambodian security, China was able to encourage Cambodian
neutrality, project its influence into Southeast Asia and, at the same
time, limit Vietnamese ambitions.
Had the Geneva agreements of 1962 been adhered to by all
parties, Laos would probably have developed a bilateral relations
regime with China similar to that of Cambodia. There was, after all,
the historical precedent of Luang Phrabang’s tributary relations simul-
taneously with Vietnam, Siam and China, in which China provided
the ultimate court of appeal. Lao neutralism was unable, however, to
withstand the political pressures of the Second Indochina War. Laos
was divided into de facto areas of control with Vietnam and the Pathet
Lao to the east, and the US and Thailand holding the Mekong valley.
China, finding Vietnamese influence over the Pathet Lao impreg-
nable, proceeded to carve out its own area of control in northern Laos
as security for its southern frontier. Under these circumstances, no
comprehensive Sino–Lao bilateral relations regime could evolve.
For a brief while, the Jakarta–Beijing axis defined a revolution-
ary bilateral relations regime between Indonesia and China that
excited Beijing’s hopes and ambitions. But this regime was highly
ideosyncratic, and lacked any historical depth. It rested, in fact, not
on shared security concerns or common interests, but on the politi-
cal needs and ambitions of one man. Sukarno needed China and the
PKI to balance the power of the army. His ambition was to lead the
world’s ‘new emerging forces’. But in this he was effectively compet-
ing with China. What shattered the illusion was not the army alone,
but the army in league with political Islam, whose horizons took little
account of China. The New Order of President Suharto, once its
political power was secure, sought leadership within Southeast Asia
through ASEAN, and thus stood in the way of an extension of
Chinese influence in the region. Just as historically strong Javanese
regimes had resisted inclusion in the Chinese world order, so no
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia