If nothing is done to resolve the sovereignty issue, time will
favour China. The Spratlys obviously fit into China’s long-term plans
to exert if not regional hegemony (which Beijing vigorously denies),
then at least preponderant political influence, which amounts to much
the same thing. South China Sea resources can contribute signifi-
cantly to China’s economic development; their distance from the
Chinese mainland will stimulate China’s naval capability to defend its
territory; and this naval power projection plus the islands’ strategic
position will translate into strategic advantage vis-à-vis Southeast Asia.
In all three ways the Spratlys would contribute to China’s national
goal of great power status. In the longer term, the US or Japan might
prefer to settle for freedom of the seas rather than risk confrontation
over the Spratlys, especially if China had already peacefully reabsorbed
Taiwan. Under these circumstances, the chances of ASEAN countries
holding onto their Spratlys claims would seem slim.
Patterns of interaction
From an historical perspective, certain patterns recur in relations
between China and the countries of Southeast Asia. To begin with, in
this longer perspective, despite the abrupt swings in Chinese foreign
policy since the founding of the PRC, China has never lost sight of key
strategic goals. While means have been influenced by ideology, inter-
nal politics (particularly during the Cultural Revolution), and the
global balance of power as viewed from Beijing, ends have remained
remarkably steady, not just for the life of the PRC, but reaching back
to the Qing dynasty.
These ends are simply stated: China is determined to regain its
‘rightful’ place as a global great power, and to be recognised, respected
and deferred to as such in the affairs of the world. To gain great power
status, China sees it as essential to reunify its national territory,
modernise and develop its economy, and build a powerful military.
Fresh beginnings