constructed—and then Southeast Asian nations proved remarkably
reluctant to join. It is significant that the ASEAN states are today just
as opposed to any balance-of-power coalition that could be construed
as aimed at China.
As we have seen, the kingdoms of Southeast Asia dealt with
China on a bilateral basis through the tributary system. In so doing,
they forged bilateral relations regimes not on the basis of similar world-
views (except for Vietnam), but through accommodation of the
Chinese world order, given key compatibilities and the moral obli-
gations to which both sides were committed. China demanded
recognition of both its status and its security interests (keeping peace
on its frontiers) in return for trading privileges and political legitimi-
sation (investiture). When Chinese armies marched into Southeast
Asia against powerful kingdoms like Vietnam and Burma, however,
whether to ‘punish’ or extend imperial frontiers, they encountered
concerted resistance. Once Chinese armies were defeated, the Viet-
namese and Burmese well understood that the only way to ensure their
future security was to re-establish the tributary bilateral relations
regime in recognition, if only symbolically, of China’s superiority. A
similar pattern of events marked the normalisation of Vietnamese rel-
ations with China a decade after their border war of 1979, as both
Vietnamese and Chinese with their long historical memories were well
aware.
The states of mainland Southeast Asia are most unlikely to be
lured into a balance-of-power coalition orchestrated by Washington
to contain China, as they well know the US would be most reluctant
to commit troops to defend them. They must deal with China, there-
fore, in their own way. That way varies from ready alliance with the
new regional hegemon in the case of Thailand, to the dour suspicion
and tough self-reliance of Vietnam, from the opportunist realism of
Burma to the weak dependency of Cambodia and Laos. The common
element in all mainland Southeast Asian bilateral relations regimes
with China, however, is that status recognition is the price of security.
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia