ASEAN state wants to be drawn into a US confrontation with China
(for example, over Taiwan), so all reject any formal alliance. There is
widespread agreement over a continuing US presence, though about
Japan, even as a US ally, there is more ambivalence. Most ASEAN
states would not be comfortable with either a militarily powerful or
politically aggressive Japan, but they do want Japan to remain a major
economic partner to offset growing Chinese economic penetration and
competition.
For China, dealing with ASEAN as a group also presents chal-
lenges. Beijing has always preferred bilateral to multilateral relations.
From at first refusing to deal with ASEAN, however, China has
become an active Dialogue Partner. Partly this was to advance Chinese
interests, but China also wants to encourage ASEAN not to turn to
outside powers. As a Chinese goal remains a reduction in the US pres-
ence and US influence, China does not want to see the US return to
bases in the Philippines, or anywhere else in the region.
To reiterate, however, the most important test of Chinese–
ASEAN relations is what happens in the South China Sea. Possession
of all the disputed islands by China would secure Beijing a strategic
bridgehead into Southeast Asia, but any move to take possession would
strengthen the alliance between continental (Vietnam) and maritime
(the Philippines, Malaysia) states, and so risk armed conflict with a
unified ASEAN, not to mention the United States. China’s strategy
has been to make maximum sovereignty claims, and then to place the
whole question of sovereignty on hold while calling for joint resource
development. This is a clever ploy. A peaceful and reasonable China
pursuing its ‘four modernisations’ presents no immediate threat. In the
longer term, when Beijing has had time to build its economic and
military power, the balance of advantage will surely change.
Logically for China, reunification with Taiwan should precede
any move in the South China Sea. This may also be a reason why the
Spratlys are on hold. But this does not mean that China has aban-
doned its expansionist ambitions, and the possibility of greatly
A Short History of China and Southeast Asia