The editors of The Wordsworth Dictionary of Mili-
tary Biography write of Montgomery’s legacy:
Like many other commanders of the Second
World War, Montgomery was haunted by the
recollection of the appalling casualties suffered
in the stagnant warfare of 1914–18, and his
battlefield tactics developed accordingly. Never
committing himself to offensive risks until pos-
sessed of superior strength, and being an ardent
believer in “set-piece” warfare, he attracted fairly
widespread criticism from other commanders;
but one cannot deny that his caution eliminated
costly setbacks such as that which occurred in the
Ardennes.... [H]is achievement in North Africa
assures him of a place in any list of outstanding
British commanders. Many observers attribute
his greatness to his ability to assess changing con-
ditions and make his plans accordingly. He was a
rigid disciplinarian, never reluctant to take harsh
action against an inefficient subordinate com-
mander, but was much respected by his troops.
He had a clear understanding of the importance
of morale: prior to his arrival in Egypt the Brit-
ish forces had been “messed about” continually,
and he immediately improved their outlook by
a number of reforms, including the inculcation
of a strong esprit de corps within individual divi-
sions. He carefully projected a personal “image”
to the troops, which laid him open to charges
of theatricality, but paid off in terms of morale.
His well-founded self-confidence and rather
Olympian manner made him enemies, but his
achievements far outweigh the petty criticisms he
attracted.
References: Moorehead, Alan, Montgomery: A Biogra-
phy (New York: Coward-McCann, 1946); Montgomery
of Alamein, Bernard Law Montgomery, Viscount, The
Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958);
D’Este, Carlo, Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story
of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign (London: Col-
lins, 1983); Horne, Alistair, The Lonely Leader: Monty,
1944–45 (London: Macmillan, 1994); “Montgomery,
Bernard Law,” in Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Military History
and Biography, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1994), 676–681; Windrow, Martin,
and Francis K. Mason, “Montgomery, Bernard Law, 1st
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,” in The Wordsworth
Dictionary of Military Biography (Hertfordshire, U.K.:
Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1997), 199–203; “Montgom-
ery, FM Sir Bernard Law, 1st Viscount,” in The Oxford
Companion to Military History, edited by Richard Holmes
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 598–599.
Montrose, James Graham, first marquis of
(fifth earl of Montrose) (1612–1650) Scottish
military leader
Born in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 1612, James Graham
was the scion of a famed Scottish family with a long
and distinguished history of supporting Scotland’s in-
dependence. He received his education at St. Andrew’s
University, then went traveling in Europe. In 1626, he
succeeded to the earldom of Montrose upon his father’s
death.
Following in his family’s footsteps, Montrose be-
came a strong advocate for the independence of Scot-
land and helped to compose the National Covenant,
which set out the steps for the acceptance of Scottish
Presbyterianism. He served in both of the Bishops’ Wars
(1638–39) against England and King Charles I, which
ended with the Treaty of Berwick. However, his moder-
ate views led to his loyalty being suspect, and Archibald
Campbell, the eighth earl of Argyll, had him impris-
oned. Once released, Montrose felt slighted enough to
go to London and offer his services to his former enemy,
Charles I, who did not take him seriously until the En-
glish Parliament went to war against the king, and the
Scots sided with Parliament. Needing a leading Scot
in his command, Charles named Montrose as captain
general of the Royalist forces in Scotland. After mak-
ing a vain attempt to invade Scotland, Montrose slipped
into his native land in disguise to recruit troops for the
Royalist cause. With this force, he went to war against
Argyll and defeated the Scots in several battles, includ-
ing at Tippermuir (1 September 1644), Inverlochy (2
February 1645), and Kilsyth (16 August 1645). Histori-
ans agree that Montrose’s victories, utilizing a small force
against superior numbers, were due to his superb tactical
skill. Had Montrose had the proper backing from the
Royalists and Charles I, he may have become far more
successful. However, Charles’s defeat at Naseby (14 June
1645), as well as his repudiation of Montrose in an at-
tempt to gain Scottish support, left Montrose severely
montRoSe, JAmeS gRAhAm, FiRSt mARquiS oF