200 music, philosophy, and modernity
depends on the metaphysics that backs it up. What, though, could
validate that metaphysics, especially given that its main contentions
depend precisely on what is supposed to be intuitively – and therefore
not discursively – available in music? Schopenhauer maintains that
‘assuming that one could succeed in giving a completely correct, com-
plete, and detailed explanation of music, thus a comprehensive rep-
etition in concepts of what it expresses, this would immediately also
be an adequate repetition and explanation of the world in concepts,
or would be equivalent to this, and so would be the true philosophy’
(ibid.: 1 , 332 – 3 ). However, as he himself admits, one cannot do this. I
suggested earlier that critiques of metaphysics in modernity often relate
to the idea that language can no longer convey substantial metaphysical
content. Schopenhauer seems to realise this, but then simultaneously
assumes that this content can besaidto be what is conveyed by music.
The need to find a better way of dealing with this issue will be apparent
in the work of Wittgenstein and Adorno, and is implicit in aspects of
Heidegger.
The appeal of Schopenhauer’s position would seem to lie in its eleva-
tion of music to real philosophical dignity. In many respects, however,
he does precisely the opposite, subordinating music to the limiting
effects of a highly contentious metaphysical vision. As Budd ( 1992 )
argues, most of Schopenhauer’s case depends upon the idea of ten-
sion and resolution in a diatonic melody, which he equates with the
nature of the Will. This already excludes many kinds of music which do
not function in terms of such tension, but Schopenhauer also excludes
many dimensions of diatonic music because he denies that music can
express the world of appearance. Music does not, he argues, express
a particular joy or sadness, but rather the essence of these emotions.
In that case, though, the specificity of the music is ignored in favour
of the philosophical claim for music’s metaphysical status: is the joy
expressed in Beethoven’s Ninth essentially the same as that in the con-
clusion ofDie Meistersinger,orinSouth African township music? The
essence of the joy is supposed to be located in the music, but why
can the music not make us feel real joy? Indeed, as I suggested in
chapter 1 , the already questionable general objection to the idea of
sad music making one sad certainly does not apply to the joyous emo-
tions which can be occasioned by music.
Schopenhauer’s arguments on these issues need not detain us for
long: they are for the most part untenable. It is much more impor-
tant to understand why they became such an influential cultural force,