wittgenstein and heidegger 277a bit more closely. The link between musical themes and propositions
is seen in terms of the possible ‘knowledge of the essence’ of logic and
music. This is a traditional metaphysical aim, and the remarks occur in
proximity to his asking ‘Is there, a priori, an order in the world, and,
if so, in what does it consist?’ (ibid.: 145 ). Wittgenstein’s work at this
time does seem to be focused on the meaning of life, as remarks like
‘God is the way everything is’ (ibid.: 173 ) make clear. This is especially
apparent when considered in relation to the claim that scientific expla-
nation only tells us how things contingently are, not how it is that they
are ordered at all. What is in question is our capacity to understand the
order of things by understanding the ‘essence of logic’. The aim seems
a strictly rationalist one, but the very fact that music is introduced into
the investigation as a response to the question of how to ‘talk about
language’, without itself being located within language, points to the
ambivalence.
Schopenhauer’s idea of music as the most direct expression of the
Will, which is not accessible as representation, is relevant to Wittgen-
stein’s ideas here. In theTractatusrepresentations are expressed in
meaningful propositions, so the domain of nonsense is in some way
related to what Schopenhauer designates by the Will. However, point-
ing out the parallel with Schopenhauer does not account for all the
implications of the remarks on music. Wittgenstein’s remarks about
the will in theNotebookslink the goodness and badness of ‘my will’ to
‘the meaning of the world’ (ibid.: 167 ), but reference to the will is omit-
ted in the equivalent part of theTractatus. This indicates an ambivalence
about positive metaphysical claims, which is confirmed when Wittgen-
stein says something that can be translated either as ‘One cannot speak
of the will as the bearer of the ethical’ (which might mean that it could
be shown), or as ‘You can’t say that the will is the bearer of the ethical’
(which would mean that it is not justifiable to do so) ( 6. 423 ibid.: 83 ).
Wittgenstein is, then, located between metaphysics 1 and metaphysics 2 ,
because the only meaningful claims have to be those of the natural
sciences, but this leaves a ‘meaning’ deficit of another kind.
Perhaps the most instructive remark in this context is the one in
which melody is ‘a kind of tautology’, ‘is complete in itself’, and ‘satis-
fies itself’. A melody does not say anything about the empirical world; it
is, though, articulated in a manner that relates to propositions which do
picture the empirical world, but whose relationship to that world cannot
be explained by further propositions. The necessary truth of the tau-
tology is the basis of understanding contingent truths, so there is a link