286 music, philosophy, and modernity
a child a language, the gestures of the voice that link to musical ges-
tures cannot themselves be rendered rule-bound, even though rules
will play a role in the practices concerned. Note how an issue central to
aesthetics – the fact that mere rule-following cannot generate significant
art – is here seen as vital for an adequate approach to both music and
language.
This connection of gesture, voice and music leads to the question:
‘how can it be explained what “expressive playing” is?’ The answer is
that one needs ‘a culture’, and that within that culture people can be
taught the ‘use of the phrase “expressive playing”’ (Wittgenstein 1981 :
28 ). This might seem like mere behaviourism. However, the point is
that the learning of the phrase is not dependent on one thing, as if
one were referring to a discrete object and teaching the use of a noise
in relation to it, but rather on a whole series of phenomena, practices,
and affective responses, which involve reflective, active participation in
a world. Perhaps the most important remark in this sequence is the
following:
Doesn’t the theme point to anything outside itself? Yes, it does! But that
means: – it makes an impression on me which is connected with things in
its surroundings – e.g. with our language and its intonations; and hence
with the whole field of our language games.
If I say for example: Here it’s as if a conclusion were being drawn,
here as if something were being confirmed, this is like an answer to what
was said before, – then my understanding presupposes a familiarity with
inferences, with confirmation, with answers.
(ibid.: 29 )The latter remark might seem to imply that logical and verbal under-
standing is prior to musical understanding, in the manner in which
Kant’s categories are the conditions of the understanding of empirical
phenomena. However, this would run counter to the image of language
being developed. Wittgenstein therefore later says:
How curious: we should like to explain our understanding of a gesture
by means of a translation into words, and the understanding of words by
translating them into a gesture. (Thus we are tossed to and fro when we
try to find out where understanding properly resides.)
And we really shall be explaining words by gesture and gesture by
words.
(ibid.: 40 )