wittgenstein and heidegger 291some respect. Heidegger’s radicalisation of these ideas depends upon
his demonstration that time, the form of intuition which Kant charac-
terises in terms of schemata that are ‘nothing butdeterminations of timea
priori according to rules’ (Kant 1968 :b 184,a 145), is inseparable from
the ‘meaning of being’. Music’s link to temporality would seem to make
it an obvious topic in relation to Heidegger’s desire to overcome tradi-
tional, atemporal metaphysics, especially in view of Hegel’s metaphys-
ical subordination of music to language because of music’s failure to
transcend time. Moreover, the links between rhythm and schematism,
suggested in Schlegel’s account of the genesis of philosophy, where
schematism was part both of thinking about nature and of the expe-
rience of nature itself, also appear to relate closely to what Heidegger
is aiming at. However, he again does not talk about music in relation
to the question of being. Despite this, what he says is important for
discussion of music and philosophy.
In the Marburg lectures of 1925 – 6 , calledLogic. The Question of
Tr uth, Heidegger argues that something essential about the subject is
missed in Kant’s transcendental account, because of the role of time
in the constitution ofDasein. If, for Kant, the I is the ‘“correlate of all
our representations”’, it ‘is... almost literally the definition of time,
which, according to Kant, stands absolutely and persists and is the cor-
relate of any appearances at all’ (Heidegger 1976 : 406 ). However, for
Heidegger, synthesis, in which identity is made from difference, could
not occur without the prior temporal opening up of being into a world
of differences, which makes it possible for being to be intelligible via
the ‘as-structure’. In consequence, the synthesising spontaneity of the
I required to articulate the world in concepts, which Kant implausi-
bly excludes from time altogether in order to prevent it being part of
the phenomenal world of causality, is secondary to the happening of
time itself, in which the world is disclosed as an object of our concern.
Any Cartesian split between I and world is therefore overcome by the
dependence ofDaseinon time. How, then, is the relationship ofDasein
as being-in-the-world to time concretely conceived? Here the path to
music becomes apparent. Heidegger talks ofDasein’s speaking, walk-
ing and understanding, such that ‘My being in the worldisnothing
but this already understanding moving myself in these ways (‘Weisen’)
of being’ (ibid.: 146 ). These forms of moving in the world, which go
along with the idea thatDaseinis always already ‘mooded/attuned’ (‘ges-
timmt’), all relate to what we associate with the function or significance
of ‘the musical’. Heidegger makes nothing of this, but a pupil, the