officer, who has been appointed by representatives in parliament or
the local council, whom we have elected. In this sense, then, the rep-
resentatives and, in turn, their officially appointed officers are said to
have democratic legitimacy.
This seems to suggest that the word ‘authority’ has an alternative
meaning; something similar to the sense we mean when we describe
somebody as being anauthority. It may be that someone is an experi-
enced art collector, so we are right to be persuaded by the arguments
she presents because she knows what she’s talking about. No force or
compulsion is needed here, beyond, that is, the force of her arguments,
her power of persuasion. She has the ability to secure voluntary com-
pliance to her way of seeing things without the use of threats or force,
because she has earned her authority.
We could say she has a ‘right’ to her authority, although it’s a dif-
ferent sense of ‘right’ from that exercised by the police officer; it’s the
right that has been earned rather than given. It’s also different from
the authority of the elected representative, although they can both be
described as being ‘an’ authority. The difference is that the art collec-
tor ’s authority has been earned as a result of her study and devotion
to her work, whereas the elected representative’s authority has been
earned as a result of putting himself up for election and campaigning
for votes. Both have authority and exercise legitimate influence because
of the respect they have earned.
Of course, others fit into this category of legitimate influence, too,
even though they have earned their authority in different ways. The
elderly in our communities have earned respect as a result of their
years of experience and the wisdom this has brought. Others have
certain personal qualities that have given them a reputation for
integrity and honesty; people we might go to for advice and support.
We could say that we have good ‘moral’ reasons for complying with
this sort of authority: that is we have reasons that convince us to act
in this way as a matter of our own free will; whereas when we comply
with orders of those who are inauthority we do so not necessarily
because we have any moral reason, that we respect them as indi-
viduals, but because we know that it would be prudent to do so.
Otherwise we might suffer in one way or another as a result of the
sanctions they can bring upon us. This threat is likely to force us,
against our will, to comply with their orders.
In this sense we may be ‘obliged’ to obey, if the local gang leader or
the mugger is threatening to harm us, but we have no ‘obligation’ to
obey, because such threats are not backed by any right to make such20 Interpretation of the QuestionHTW2 7/26/01 8:43 PM Page 20