And since the interpretive portraitist has the power
to present via his photographs an image of the sub-
ject that is in conflict with the image that that sub-
ject desires to project, an ethically problematic
situation arises.
Danto illustrates his claim by discussing two
portraits of the Warhol-orbit transvestite Candy
Darling, one made by Richard Avedon and the
other by Peter Hujar. Candy Darling desired to
project the image of a glamourous, female, Holly-
wood film star, notwithstanding her biological
maleness. To do so she dressed in the attire,
arranged her hair, and exhibited body language
and patterns of speech evocative of Lana Turner
or Kim Novak. However, when Avedon invited
Warhol and members of the Factory to his studio
for a group portrait he apparently asked Candy
Darling (and several others) to disrobe, so that in
the portrait Candy Darling is naked—her penis
fully in view—thus presenting an image of her
radically at odds with the one she desired to
project. Hujar’s portrait, by way of contrast,
made in a hospital room in the period before
Candy Darling’s death, shows his subject fully in
character, playing out the role of a participant in
a glamourous death. Danto is highly critical of
Avedon for his ‘‘morally bruising’’ treatment of
Candy Darling’s desired image, and praises Hujar
for having ‘‘submerged his artistic will to that of
the subject.’’
The plausibility of Danto’s ethical judgment
hinges on whether it is desirable to construe the
role of the interpretive portraitist so that she is
always constrained by a respect for the desired
self-image of her subject. While in many instances
we may laud a portraitist for submerging her
artistic will in this way (certainly this is the case
with Hujar’s portrait of Candy Darling), there are
at least as many instances imaginable in which we
feel that the subject’s desired self-image is proble-
matic in some respect (inappropriate, vain, in-
flated, etc.), and that the portraitist is doing all
parties involved a favor by violating it. An exam-
ple might be the portrait made by Diane Arbus of
Norman Mailer (Author Norman Mailer in His
Brooklyn Home, 1963). At the time she made the
portrait, Mailer’s public image as the embodiment
of virile manliness was at its peak, and yet Arbus
produced an image that suggests Mailer is physi-
cally underendowed. It is arguable that such treat-
ment, notwithstanding the ‘‘moral bruising’’ of
Mailer’s image it perhaps involved, was appropri-
ate at that time. Given this possibility, in order to
complete his examination of the moral structure of
such images, Danto will need to provide some
guidance regarding when—and when not—it is
appropriate for the portraitist to impose her artis-
tic will.
A related debate arose with the publication of a
series of photographs taken by Diane Arbus in the
early 1970s of residents of homes for the mentally
handicapped (Diane Arbus, Untitled, Aperture,
1995). In an article published in theNew York Obser-
ver, the photography critic A.D. Coleman harshly
condemned Arbus’s daughter Doon for allowing
such publication. His central claim was that such
images constitute ‘‘a fundamental violation of
human rights,’’ presumably because they project
images of subjects who could not have provided
the kind of informed consent in the use of their
images that Danto’s position apparently requires.
In her essay ‘‘Aristocrats,’’ Janet Malcolm takes
a much more positive attitude towards the Arbus
publication. She argues that the subjects are por-
trayed in a very positive light, reflecting Arbus’s
attitude that those born with their traumas are
society’s true aristocrats—they have (in Arbus’s
words) ‘‘already passed their test in life.’’ As well,
Malcolm suggests that the images can benefit cur-
rent residents of homes for the mentally handi-
capped by presenting images that convey such
nobility. These positive consequences, Malcolm
seems to suggest, override any concerns we should
have about violations of individual rights.
It is difficult—perhaps impossible—to resolve the
debate between Coleman and Malcolm. They em-
phasize different axioms of ethical thinking, axioms
that are inherently in conflict. Coleman places a
premium on concerns about violations of human
rights, concerns that are not lessened by observing
that such violations can have positive consequences.
Malcolm, by way of contrast, is apparently willing to
forgo concerns about human rights if the benefits of
doing so are great enough. The difference between
the two positions is thus an instance of the tradi-
tional philosophical conflict between deontological
and teleological approaches to ethics.Street Photography
The street-photography context involves a photogra-
pher making non-photojournalistic images of human
subjects in public locations typically without their
permission and often without their knowledge. Clas-
sic examples of this sort include images by Bill Brandt,
Manuel A ́lvarez Bravo, Henri Cartier-Bresson,
Robert Frank, Helen Levitt, and Garry Winogrand.
The legal status of such activity is clear. The
general rule is that in the United States photogra-
phers are free to publish images of any person whoETHICS AND PHOTOGRAPHY