These can be decided neither by a previously determined general norm nor by the judg-
ment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party” (Schmitt 1976 [1963], 26–27).
5. Exploring Common Worlds
- Even when J. G. A. Pocock, in his classic, monumental work (Pocock 1975), reha-
bilitates Machiavelli and the tradition he represents, he always does so, at best, by rep-
resenting Machiavelli as a descendant of Aristotle, accepting as a consequence that po-
litical skill remains infinitely removed from epistemology. - On all these metaphors for the political body, see the analysis ofGorgiasin
Latour 1999b, chapters 7–8. - Despite its claims, the discourse of power does not reveal the presence that is
behind relations of force; it participates in it (see the conclusion). Critical discourse is
completely molded by (political) epistemology; it is the adopted son common to Socra-
tes and Callicles. On the notion of power, see, for example, Law 1986. Here is the whole
difference between critical sociology, which uses the notion of power as its principal
weapon and the sociologyofcriticism, which is interested in the sociologists’ obses-
sion with discourse in terms of power. In addition to the work of Boltanski and
Thévenot 1991, see, on the anthropology of the critical gesture, Latour and Weibel
- This has nothing to do, of course, with the legitimizing of the established facts—
the power relations—cherished by critical sociology, which believes it is making great
advances by resuming the discourse of primary qualities and secondary qualities: vio-
lence becomes the power of causal explanation invisible to the actors, whileillusio
spreads its mantle of arbitrary significations over the nakedness of power relations.
Naturalization expands once again, but this time on the courtyard side of society and
no longer on the garden side of nature; on the critique of legitimization, see Favereau
- In this section I am summarizing Latour 1993 and Latour 1999b, 193–202.
- Let me recall that the expression “political enemy” no longer has the meaning of
“subhuman,” “lecherous viper,” or some other insult, but that it is henceforth used as a
term of respect: what endangers the collective today may be an ally tomorrow, and mo-
rality, which “salvages” those who have been excluded, is in no way at stake. - One might wonder about the link between the crimes and cataclysms of the cen-
tury that has just ended and this suicidal and apocalyptic conception. At bottom, the
moderns always desire their own disappearance, the disappearance of theiroikos.Their
grudge is not against nature; it is against themselves. (On this topic, see Jonas 1984,
chapter 6, on utopia.) - For want of a better term. Beck proposes “reflexive” or “second” modernization
(Beck, Giddens, et al. 1994). - This is the meaning of the past perfect tense in the expression “we have never
been modern.” It is a question not of one more illusion, but of an active interpretation
of the history of the West, which has had a formidable performative effect but which is
gradually losing its effectiveness and which thus obliges us to reinterpret the past—a
NOTES TO PAGES 179–192
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