tion process, USAID effectively made the case of why
and how fragility is highly relevant in the context of
a U.S. “whole of government,” approach particularly
within the backdrop of recent Presidential directives
and policy reviews, such as:
- National Security Presidential Directive
(NSDP-44) - Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Global
Development - 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS)
- 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Develop-
ment Review (QDDR) - 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
- 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS).
These policy drivers recognize the necessity for
better coordinated planning, programming, and coor-
dinated use of USG hard and soft power—or “smart
power”—and strongly advocate its utility and place
in full-spectrum operations. The first paragraph of
DOD’s 2011 NMS emphasizes this new imperative,
the necessity for ensuring stability, and key objectives
to “strengthen international and regional security”
and “counter violent extremism,” which squarely as-
serts the increased relevance and operational need to
reduce fragility (2011, 1 & 4).
This smart power framework suggests the U.S.
Army’s doctrinal inclusion of fragility for SSTR pur-
poses is highly appropriate but may still be too lim-
ited in scope. Operationalizing the term requires and
complements expansion from SSTR operations to
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
and engagement missions. In doing so, fragility’s rel-
evance for U.S. Army missions becomes evident as
fragility monitoring and early warning approaches
show promise to proactively support U.S. regional
commands’ situational awareness and visibility of