The previously cited Brookings report summarizes
the proliferation risks that are currently inherent in
expanded peaceful uses of nuclear energy:
An expansion of the civilian nuclear sector to include
new actors will bring with it a wider diffusion of nu-
clear materials, technologies, and knowledge at a time
when the international regulatory regime is struggling
to cope with existing security and safety concerns. The
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), the foundation of international efforts to ensure
nuclear non-proliferation, is facing both institutional
and operational challenges with respect to current nu-
clear activities. Any expansion of nuclear commerce
involving the spread of sensitive technologies such as
uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing will
put additional pressure on a fragile non-proliferation
regime leading to increased risks (Banks et al. 2010,
vi).Two aspects of the NPT are essentially, though
perhaps unintentionally, at odds with each other.
The basic intent of the NPT is to reduce the risk of
nuclear war by preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. It also openly allows for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. The conundrum is that a nation which
possesses a self-sufficient nuclear energy program,
subsequently also possesses the capability to conduct
a nuclear weapons program.
The two areas specifically called out in the Brook-
ings report are uranium enrichment and spent fuel
processing. Addressing the latter first, “plutonium is
created in most nuclear reactors, including those built
to produce electric power” (Muller 2008, 136). Profes-
sor Muller explains: “It (plutonium) comes out mixed
with other nuclear waste, but it can be separated us-
ing relatively straightforward chemistry” (Muller