not accept Husserl’s position as explained here, when it comes to the
“matter” of mental images.^24
Husserl responds that one must look to the “motivations” of the one
intending the object. Thus someone motivated to examine the Du ̈rer
engraving for its physical features will intend the hyle ́in one way, whereas
someone wishing to view it aesthetically will “inform” the hyle ́in another
way. But in both cases, the image depends on extrinsic considerations
(motifs). And this, Sartre argues, repeats the problem about the “true” image
raisedinthepreviouschapter.Thistimeitisthe“motifs”thatarein
question: “In the earlier case, we responded that if the psychological con-
tents are equivalent, there is no way to determine the true image. Now one
must reply: if the stuff (matieres) is of the same nature, one cannot find any valuable reason (motif)there”(Ion 156 ). Still, Sartre concedes that Husserl offers the beginning of an answer by distinguishing the “necessarily spon- taneous” nature of the imaging act with the passive syntheses of perceptual consciousness that are subject to theflow of time. “So every fiction would be an active synthesis whereas every perception is a purely passive synthesis. The difference between image-fiction and perception would then come from the deep structure of the intentional syntheses” (Ion 157 ). To this, Sartre remarks, “we subscribe completely to this explanation. But it still remains quite incomplete” (Ion 157 ). He then proceeds to raise objections that we will find him elaborating inThe Imaginary. First, he questions whether the hyle ́is in any way changed by spontaneous imaging consciousness or consists of a mere addition of elements (of a horse and a man, as in the case of the Centaur, according to Descartes and Spinoza). In the latter case, we are faced with the seeming incom- patibility of the impressed stuff (la matiere impressionnelle) of perception
with the intentional mode of the image-fiction. We shall see Sartre
dealing with this issue in his aesthetics of paintings and theater perform-
ances inThe Imaginary. And however one deals with this incompatibility,
one must still face the radical severance of the image-fiction from the
image-memory, because Husserl, by defending the neutrality or indiffer-
ence of the hyle ́, does not seem able to deal with the numerous inter-
mediary forms between fiction and memory. Either he must make both
syntheses (of perception and image) passive – which revives problems of
(^24) SeeIre 45 , 54 , 102 and below, page 116.
92 First triumph:The Imagination