freedom grounded in Nothingness (le Ne ́ant). Each will find theoretical
analysis and systematic unification inBeing and Nothingness, which, as we
have just seen, is already being sketched in these notebooks.
Truth to oneselfIn a remarkable anticipation of a thesis essential toBN, Sartre observes:
For there to be desire, it’s necessary that the desired object should be concretely
present – it and no other – in the innermost depths of the for-itself [roughly
consciousness] but present as a nothingness that affects it or, more accurately, as a
lack. And this is possible only if the for-itself, in its very existence, is susceptible to
being defined by these lacks. Which means that no lack can come from the outside
to the for-itself. Just as, in the case of bad faith, lies to oneself are possible only if
consciousness is by nature what it is not, so desire is possible only if the for-itself is
by naturedesire – in other words, if it islackby nature...So if, at the source of
all desire and of will, it’s really necessary to posit existential lack as characteristic
of consciousness, then we must ask ourselves the two fundamental questions: what is
lack? What is lacking?
(WD 233 )
What he calls “existential lack” will emerge inBNas a defining charac-
teristic of “human reality,” namely, the fundamental desire to coincide
consciously with itself. But this is an ontological impossibility akin to
trying to square the circle: consciousness is nonself-identical whereas the
nonconscious (the in-itself) is identical. Nonetheless, this impossible
desire generates a set of specific “lacks” in a vain drive to fill them while
remaining conscious. This lies behind a famous line fromBN: man is a
“futile passion”^14 to be consciously self-identical with himself. To be
consciously self-identical, in Sartre’s view, is what we mean by “God.”
This rich text anticipates several defining features ofBeing and Noth-
ingnessitself. For example, the close connection, if not functional iden-
tity, of consciousness with the for-itself and nothingness. Likewise, the
paradoxical claim that “lies to oneself are possible only if consciousness
is by nature what it is not.” In effect, consciousness is a notable exception
to the principle of identity (“a thing is what it is and not another thing”)
that has served as a philosophical principle since the Greek Parmenides
(c.445 bc). This is an ontological basis for self-deception, or what Sartre
(^14) Passion inutile(BN 615 ;F 708 ).
Authenticity: initial sketches 167