“the dimension of transphenomenal being in the subject” (BNli). This
is what Sartre called the “for-itself ” inWD. Again, as consciousness, this
mode of being is essentially other-referring, that is, it is what Husserl
called “intentional.” In this respect, “all consciousness is positional in
that it transcends itself in order to reach an object and exhausts itself in
this same positing”(BNli). But it does so consciously; in other words, its
direct or positional consciousness of an object is indirect or nonposi-
tional consciousness of itself. Building on an insight from the German
idealist Gottlieb Fichte, Sartre avoids any infinite regress (of reflection
on reflection to infinity...to account for knowing that you know) by
insisting that consciousness is implicitly self-aware whenever it is aware
of anything. But consciousness of self is not dual, Sartre insists: “If we
wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-
cognitive relation of the self to itself ” (BNlii–liii). This he seems to
believe relieves him from any need for appeal to an unconscious or for
grounding consciousness in anything but itself. He continues to argue, as
he had in the early 1930 s, that no ego or substantial self is needed to
ground or individualize this consciousness.
Sartre’s “Cartesianism” comes to the fore with his appeal to con-
sciousness and, specifically, to the trademarkCogito(I think) that sets
Descartes’ philosophy in forward motion. But Sartre is Cartesian as
he is Husserlian and Heideggerian (or later Marxist) ever in his own
way.^35 He seeks the “apodicticity” (the self-confirming evidence) of the
Cogito.“Thecogitomust be our point of departure,” he states (BN
73 – 74 ). But we have seen him employ Heidegger’s “preunderstanding”
widely. Can he accommodate the evidence of theCogitoto the suggest-
ive nuances of a hermeneutics? Clearly Heidegger did not think so
and so avoided appeal to consciousness inBT. But Sartre introduces
consciousness into the preunderstanding with his concept of thepre-
reflectiveCogito.TheCogitois a reflective act that, at its best, yields the
clarity and distinctness of explicit evidence that Sartre values so much.
Sartre is indeed Cartesian in this respect. But theCogitois derivative;
it relies on a prereflectiveCogitothat takes ontological and epistemic
precedence; it is at this prereflective level that “preontological” under-
standing occurs.
(^35) SeeCP 68.
Being and Nothingness 179