philosopher of freedom now begins to cash in the concept of freedom-in-
situation that he had introduced inBeing and Nothingness. He starts
by linking what has come to be known as negative (the absence of
constraints) and positive freedom (“concrete” freedom in his vocabulary)
to the analytic and synthetic mentalities respectively. No doubt freedom
“as the definition of man” remains an ontological given in this discussion
as it will throughout his work. But conceived here in analytic terms
“freedom” implies that “a politically active individual has no need to
forge human nature,” which for the analyst is universal and timeless.
“It is enough for him to eliminate the obstacles that might prevent him
from blossoming” (Introduction 257 ). Overlooking for the moment the
economic considerations that will subsequently enter his sociohistorical
accounts, Sartre’s attention is drawn toward the analytical habit of mind.
“Oneconstitutesoneself as a bourgeois by choosing, once and for all, a
certain analytic perspective on the world which one attempts to foist
on all men and which excludes the perception of collective realities”
(Introduction 257 ). Midway through the essay he introduces the term
“dialectical” to contrast the synthetic view of human emotions with the
“psychological atomism” employed by Proust. Hereafter that term will
be associated with the synthesizing rationality and the cultural world that
Sartre is absorbing from his review of Hegel and Marx.^10
Three additional concepts and issues deserve mention as we conclude
our discussion of the Introduction. The first is the distinction Sartre
draws betweenhuman nature(a static and universal concept) and the
human condition, that denotes “The totality of constraints that limit [us] a
priori such as the necessity of being born and dying, of beingfiniteand of
existing in the world among other men”; but these constraints also
include the “indivisible totalities whose ideas, moods, and acts are
secondary, dependent structures and whose essential characteristic lies
in beingsituated” (Introduction 260 ). Whereas “human nature” is basic-
ally context-free, “human condition” is situational. We recognize here an
elaboration on the “metaphysical condition” of being in-situation from
(^10) On the controversy over the presence of a dialectic in Sartre’s previous work, especially
Being and Nothingness, see above,Chapter 7. Sartre does link the spirit of synthesis with
“those who have profoundly understood that man is rooted in the collectivity and who want
to affirm the importance of historical, technical, and socioeconomic factors” in this compre-
hension (Intro. 262 ). But he explicitly insisted inBNthat “there is no dialectic for my
relations toward the Other but rather a circle” (BN 363 ).
234 Existentialism: the fruit of liberation