animals and inanimate objects. It is from this starting point that one can pose the
problems of class. I am convinced of that.^22
His turn to the structures of dialectical thought (the regressive move-
ment) sets the ahistorical (synchronic) conditions for the dialectic that is
historical (diachronic) and respectful of the primacy of “free organic
praxis.” It is such praxis that guards existential moral responsibility
amidst impersonal forces and relations (again, “the meanness is not
entirely in the system”) (seeCP 183 ).
But if ontological issues are more fundamental than the socioeco-
nomic (in the sense that a social ontology is more basic than an appeal to
“economism” in understanding history), then Sartre’s approach to
historical understanding is not rationalist, not even a dialectical ration-
alism which would leave no room for chance or contingencies in general.
In this matter, Sartre has softened his critique of “certain Marxist
theorists” who seemed reduced to explaining the concrete via appeal to
chance events (seeSM 56 ). We have seen that even the unblinking eye of
prereflective consciousness, can be “clouded” by historical conditions.^23
While the second volume ends rather than concludes with an impres-
sive set of additional reflections that enrich the previous discussion even
as they lead us into the progressive argument of the Flaubert, let our
present consideration of theCritiquesuffice to open the book on Sartre’s
social ontology and the productive overlap of dialectical ontology and the
regressive-progressive method.
(^22) Schilpp 14.
(^23) At this point, let me repeat an observation I made on similar material some years ago:
The foregoing examples of the boxing match and of historical Stalinism, coupled with
our analysis of the basic “notions” of enveloping totalization and incarnation, lead us to
the conclusion that if history is not rigorous in the sense of confirming to a universal
schematism such as Marx, Oswald Spengler or even Arnold Toynbee have proposed,
neither is it a plurality of random events and their causes (the positivists’ “one damn
thing after another”). The individual and chance character of praxis, the fact that praxis
“overflows” into process or that contingencies of individual facticity are ingredient in
social action – this in no way implies that history occurs haphazardly. “Contingency
appears only through strict exigencies. Through all its deviations and all its side-tracks,”
Sartre assures us, “we shall see later on that the historical process continues on its path.
Only this path is not defined a priori by the transcendental dialectic” (CDRii: 226 ). As
we have come to expect, it is determined by praxis and the practico-inert.
(SFHRi:170)
354 Individuals and groups:Critique of Dialectical Reason