Ethical paradoxThe root of what Sartre calls “the ethical paradox” lies in the ambiguity
of its basic term, thenorm. As we shall see in the next subsection, norms
support both authentic and inauthentic moral approaches. In fact, this
term recurs often both in the Rome and in the Cornell lectures. Though
the paradoxical nature of moral reasoning has accompanied Sartre from
the start, it is in these lectures that it comes to the fore, so prominently
that one could call the dialectical ethics an ethics of paradox. As his
colleague Merleau-Ponty was considered the philosopher of ambiguity,^21
so Sartre could be known as the moralist of paradox.
Sartre has consistently opposed the naturalist fallacy – that you can
derive “ought” from “is” or, as we might now say, morality from history –
ever since his discussion of values inBeing and Nothingness. At the
conclusion ofBNhe writes: “Ontology itself cannot formulate ethical
precepts. It is concerned solely with what is, and we can not possibly
derive imperatives from ontology’s indicatives. It does, however, allow us
to catch a glimpse of what sort of ethics will assume its responsibilities
when confronted with ahuman reality in situation”(BN 626 , emphasis
added). As he implies in “Materialism and Revolution,” the concept
of situation may serve to bridge this gap between fact and value, is and
ought. The revolutionary solution (“radical ethics”) seems called upon
to play this difficult role in the Cornell lectures andHope Now,ifonly,
as the latter records, one can dissociate the concepts of revolution and
terror, fraternity and violence.
After explaining that “existential psychoanalysis is moral description,
for it releases to us the ethical meaning of various human projects,”
Sartre continues:
It indicates to us the necessity of abandoning the psychology of interest along with any
utilitarian interpretation of human conduct – by revealing to us theidealmeaning of all
human attitudes [viz. the desire to be in-itself-for itself or “God”]. These meanings are
beyond egoism and altruism, beyond any behavior which is calleddisinterested...We
will consider then that all human existence is passion, the famous self-interest being
only one way freely chosen among others to realize this passion.
(BN 626 )
(^21) Alphonse de Waelhens,Une Philosophie de l’ambiguı ̈te ́: l’existentialisme de Maurice Merleau-
Ponty(Louvain: Be ́atrice-Nauwelaerts, 1967 ).
The Rome lecture: “Morality and Society” 361