and oppression that scarcity (and human agents) have inflicted on human
history as we know it – whether, in sum, the contradiction between
Ethics and History can be resolved,be it only once and in the realm
of the imaginary(SG 599 ). This remains a lingering option not to be
ignored.^47 The imaginary is emerging as both a beacon of hope and a
counsel of despair.
“ 4. The Paradox of the Ethos”
Sartre’s second ethics might well have been called the ethics of paradox,
except that the paradoxical nature of ethics had been a staple in his
philosophical diet for years. As early asWhat is Literature?( 1948 )he
reflects:
The contemplation of beauty might well arouse in us the purely formal intention
of treating men as ends, but this intention would reveal itself to be utterly futile
in practice, since the fundamental structures of our society are still oppressive. Such
is the presentparadox of ethics...For good will is not possible in this age, or rather,
it can only be theintentionof making goodwill possible.
(WL 221 – 223 , emphasis added)
As we have seen, the ethical paradox is a complex, multifaceted phenom-
enon. In this progressive section of his argument, Sartre is considering
the mediating factors that will bring this paradox to a head. This is a
concrete issue, even if it does not so much resolve the paradox as
enable us to live with its ambiguity, ideally in a creative manner. Juliette
Simont states the matter concisely: “Historicity of ends, inert perman-
ence of ethical action,” this is what Sartre, under various descriptions,
has called the “ethical paradox” (CSC 51 ). As we saw in the Rome
lecture, it is a matter of transcending (de ́passer) the historical givens
of a society or tradition that are repetitious or inert, closing off the
possibility of pursuing an “open future.” This echoes the abiding mantra
of Sartrean existentialism: “You can always make something out of what
you’ve been made into” – even as it recalls Sartre’s ontological dualism
of spontaneity and inertia.
(^47) See CSC 48 , andSaint Genet, cited above inChapter 11 page 299.
The Cornell lectures: “Morality and History” 375