These remarks demand elaboration. Does Sartre mean that contin-
gency is a “purely psychologicalErlebniss,” as he will say of the “we
subject” inBeing and Nothingness, a position he will later reject in the
Critique? That would seem to fly in the face of the experience of
contingency that he is describing in the futureNausea. There contin-
gency clearly carries ontological significance. Certainly inBNhe will list
the experience of “nausea” along with “anguish” (Angst) among a special
class of phenomena, namelyphenomena of being.^7 As we shall see shortly,
the experience of “nausea” is psychological insofar as it is an experience.
But as a phenomenon, it is not merely psychological. It carries an
ontological significance, namely, as a phenomenon of thecontingencyof
being. Despite the present remark, we shall see inTranscendence of the
Egothat contingency, on Sartre’s considered reading, is entirely a prop-
erty of being, as much as or even more than the “frightful” is a property
of the Japanese mask.^8
As forcomprehension, a major term in Sartre’s emerging epistemology,
Sartre mentions briefly two aspects of this form of understanding,
namely that it is holistic, relating whole to whole, and that it involves a
kind ofsympathyon our part for such relationships. He concludes this
brief reflection with the remark that “it is possible to comprehend
contingency, [but] not to explain it. At most one can make it felt” (OR
1685 ). Indeed, one can say that the object ofNausea, both the novel itself
and the novel within that novel, is precisely to get us to “feel” our
(^7) See below,Chapter 8. In this respect, it is worth noting that the subtitle ofBeing and
Nothingnessis “A PhenomenologicalOntology” (emphasis added). In his interview with
Michel Rybalka et al., for the volume on his thought in the Library of Living Philosophers
series, Sartre remarked that what distinguished him from the Marxists was his ongoing
concern with questions of Being, “which is wider than class.” In effect, Sartre was an
ontologist in addition to being a moralist throughout his career (“Interview with Jean-Paul
Sartre,” in Paul A. Schilpp [ed.],The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre[Carbondale, IL: Open
Court, 1981 ], 14 ; hereafter Schilpp). As we shall see, he also remained a metaphysician and
8 respected its difference from ontology, even if he sometimes failed to observe it.
See this example of his analysis of the “intentionality” of consciousness inChapter 5 .Briefly,
“intentionality” is the defining feature of consciousness. Every conscious act “intends” or “aims
at” an object that is “in the world” and not simply “in” the mind. Sartre’s example is the frightful
character of a Japanese mask. Because of the intentionality of consciousness, the “frightful” is a
feature of the mask itself and not merely the “projection” of our “inner” emotion on a piece of
wood. In fact, for Sartre, there is no “inner” life, no “inside/outside” consciousness that would
leave us with the skeptical doubt that the inside and the outside “match.” This mini-summary
must suffice until we deal with phenomenology in detail below inChapter 5.
52 Teaching in the lyce ́e, 1931–1939