Green partiesearly to draw any firm conclusions about the electoral impact of government
incumbency. On the one hand, the Finnish Green League slightly improved
its electoral performance both in 1999, after four years in the coalition gov-
ernment, and again in 2003, despite (or because of?) having resigned from
the coalition in the previous year over its opposition to the government’s
decision to build a new nuclear power station. The German Greens strength-
ened their position in 2002, and declined only marginally in 2005. By con-
trast, having entered government on the basis of a very strong performance
in the 1999 election, both the Belgian green parties suffered humiliating
electoral defeats four years later. The electoral fortunes of the French and
Italian green parties, both of which agreed pre-election pacts with larger
centre-left parties, were shaped by the electorate’s assessment of the gov-
ernment as a whole at the end of its term in office, as was the return of
theItalians to government in 2006 (even though their share of the vote has
hardly changed in the last three elections). Perhaps all we can say so far is
that entering government is notnecessarilybad for green parties.
In seeking explanations for the variations in performance, two factors
standout (Rudig ̈ 2006 ). First, the Greens themselves can make a differ-
ence, through the conduct of the party (both its leading politicians and the
grassroots membership) and the popularity of Green policy initiatives. For
example, government office brings a much higher profile for Green politi-
cians, with both positive and negative results. Whilst the individual popu-
larity of Germans Joschka Fischer and Renate Kunast rose significantly after ̈
holding ministerial office, public perceptions of the competence of Belgian
Green ministers, Martha Aelvoet and Isabelle Durant, plummeted. Secondly,
institutional features, notably the links between the Greens and their coali-
tion partners, can have an electoral impact. The German Greens benefited
in 2002 especially from tactical voting by many SPD supporters who ‘split
their ticket’ by voting for the Greens with their second ‘list’ vote, to help
them reach the 5 per cent threshold that would ensure their presence in
parliament and the continuation of the red–green coalition. However, the
Belgian Greens, having resigned from the coalition government just two
weeks before the 2003 election, probably lost support as potential voters
switched to the Socialists to ensure the survival of the government (R ̈udig
2006 ). Where a pre-election pact occurs it is vital that the Greens continue to
perform well in second-order elections, such as the European and regional
elections, to demonstrate their continued importance to the major coalition
party.
The second challenge is for green parties to extend their electoral appeal
beyond the small group of rich industrialised nations where they have
achieved successes to date. In particular, a key objective must be to secure
afoothold in the transitional states of Central and Eastern Europe, notably
therecent EU accession member states. Ecological parties did achieve
some short-lived successes in several countries, including Estonia, Lithuania,