Party politics and the environmentlargely ignored (Biorcio 2002 : 45–7). Green ministers have proven influ-
ential on several conservationist issues, particularly where backed by EU
legislation. For example, the Finnish government implemented the Natura
2000 nature reserve network, despite strong lobbying from agricultural and
forestry interests which wanted to reduce the size of the protected areas.
The German Greens passed a new federal nature protection law in 2002. The
presence of Greens in government may also have produced more progres-
sive environmental policies in other policy areas. For example, the French
Greens claimed they were responsible for various initiatives to reform food
production and encourage more sustainable agriculture (Boy 2002 :74–5).
Kunast, as German agriculture minister, made significant steps towards a
more sustainable agricultural policy, particularly by encouraging organic
farming,and strengthening food safety standards.
Green parties have certainly helped shape the left-libertarian policy
agenda of their respective coalition governments. A range of liberal reforms
giving greater protection to asylum-seekers, new rights to illegal immigrants
and legal status to gay and lesbian relationships owed much to the presence
of green parties. Perhaps, as Poguntke ( 2002 :140) suggests, it was the absence
of core economic interests opposing these legislative initiatives, allied to
their low financial cost, which enabled them to succeed here.
Perhaps the most important long-term outcome of their time in govern-
ment was that Green ministers generally demonstrated to the electorate that
theycould be trusted to hold government office. Greens proved to be co-
operative coalition partners and competent, responsible policymakers. They
belied the expectation in some quarters that a protest party consisting of
‘disorganised hippies’ and ‘left-wingers’, and accountable to a radical, crit-
ical grassroots membership, would not cope with the pressures of office.
Tobe sure, there were public spats, internal conflicts and a few humiliat-
ing moments, but these features are hardly unusual in coalition govern-
ments. Sometimes straddling the twin challenges of keeping the member-
ship happy and winning wider public support proved impossible. Rank and
file members were inevitably disappointed by some of the unpalatable com-
promises required of coalition government, as when Voynet climbed down
over placing a moratorium on GM crops and Trittin complied with Chan-
cellor Schroder’s demand (in response to energetic lobbying by Volkswagen) ̈
that he veto a proposed EU directive on the recycling of cars. Unforeseen
events also forced governments to make unpopular decisions. The Kosovo
crisis led Joschka Fischer, as German foreign minister, to support military
policies (NATO air strikes on Serbia) that flouted the long-standing green
principle of pacifism. Later he overcame even stronger opposition within the
party to support the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (Rudig ̈ 2002 : 93–6). Yet
theGerman Greens survived these crises and were re-elected in 2002. Only
theBelgian green parties left office with a somewhat tarnished reputation
after two of their three ministers resigned in controversial circumstances:
Magda Aelvoet (Agalev) resigned over her support for a government decision