PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
both groups were originally on the margins of the political system and made
wide use of unconventional tactics, over time each has adopted a more con-
ventional repertoire of actions. This shift from outsider to insider is most
marked for FoE. In its early years, FoE frequently used direct action (usually
within the law), such as the 1971 campaign to return non-returnable soft-
drink bottles to Schweppes depots in Britain. Nevertheless, FoE has always
employed a mixture of strategies; in particular, it pins great weight on the
technical rationality of its case and likes to ‘win the argument’. It gained
considerable respect in Britain for its performance in the public inquiry into
nuclear fuel reprocessing at Windscale in 1977, a success that encouraged
it to move closer to the mainstream environmental lobby (Lowe and Goy-
der 1983 ). As it grew, FoE was able to devote more resources to monitoring
government activities, publishing technical reports, using the judicial sys-
temand lobbying politicians and civil servants. Over time, the balance of
its activities has gradually shifted from criticism and confrontation to prac-
tical, advice-based campaigning (McCormick 1991 :118). Today, FoE is regu-
larly consulted by government and sometimes its representatives are found
on official committees. Consequently, it eschews the grand confrontational
gestures that helped build its reputation but which might now lose it the
respectability needed for regular insider status. Where FoE once relished
direct action, it is now hesitant to use it because it cannot afford to break
thelawforfear of having its financial assets sequestered by the courts.
Greenpeace remains more firmly wedded to the principle of direct action.
It has always recognised the power of the media image, and quickly became
associated with dramatic stunts that captured the attention of millions of
viewers. A key event was theRainbow Warriorincident in 1985. This Green-
peace ship, which was used to protest against French nuclear testing, was
blown up by French government agents while it was docked in a New
Zealand port, killing a crew member. The resulting publicity contributed
to the rapid growthof Greenpeace as an international organisation. Yet
this transformation brought new strategic dilemmas. Greenpeace had devel-
oped a symbiotic relationship with the media, based on its ingenious use
of ‘guerrilla theatre’ to dramatise environmental destruction (Shaiko 1993 :
97). These high-profile direct actions undoubtedly helped push issues such as
whaling, sealing and the Antarctic into the limelight. The problem was that
thetactics upon which Greenpeace built its reputation seemed to have a lim-
ited shelf-life; stunts needed to be ever more extreme to attract the interest
of media that were becoming bored with repetition. As a big international
NGO, Greenpeace now had the resources to develop new strategies (and, like
FoE, it became increasingly reluctant to break the law),^7 so it adopted a more
constructive ‘solutions-led’ approach (Rose 1993 ). This strategy built on the
scientific expertise on which Greenpeace had always prided itself, by com-
missioning research, disseminating findings and appointing more scientists
tokeyposts (Jamison et al. 1990 :117). It also reflected Greenpeace’s belief
that power has shifted significantly from governments to corporations. By