Global environmental politicsface of traditional realist assumptions about the way states behave in a sys-
tem of international relations where, historically, conflict and mistrust have
been the norm. This chapter starts with a short conceptual discussion of this
paradox, drawing principally on neo-realist and institutionalist theories of
international relations. Thenext sectionoutlines the emergence of two of
themost important recent MEAs, dealing with ozone depletion and climate
change, and the following section provides a wide-ranging discussion of
thefactors determining whether or not nation states choose to co-operate
toprotect the global commons. Although a MEA may represent a diplo-
matic triumph, it does not guarantee that the problem addressed will be
resolved, and thenext sectionassesses some of the difficulties confronting
the implementation of MEAs, emphasising how the capacity of states to
enforce environmental agreements is inextricably linked to wider issues of
international political economy. The chapter concludes with an assessment
of the relationship between international environmental politics and sus-
tainable development.
◗ The paradox of international co-operation
International environmental co-operation may be desirable, but severe col-
lective action problems make it difficult to achieve. As Hurrell and Kings-
bury ( 1992 )ask: ‘Can a fragmented and often highly conflictual political
system made up of over 170 sovereign states and numerous other actors
achieve the high (and historically unprecedented) levels of cooperation and
policy coordination needed to manage environmental problems on a global
scale?’ (p. 4). Unlike a domestic political system where a national govern-
ment can regulate behaviour and levy taxes, there is no central sovereign
authority in the international arena to co-ordinate policy responses to prob-
lems of the global commons or to ensure that sovereign states comply
with agreements. According to the neo-realist perspectives that long dom-
inated academic international relations, individual sovereign states oper-
ate in an anarchic system in which their behaviour is almost exclusively
shaped by considerations of power politics (Morgenthau 1978 ). The primary
aim of each nation state is to survive by accumulating more power rela-
tive to other countries. As no nation can fully trust the intentions of oth-
ers, individual countries are unlikely to co-operate to protect the global
commons. If individual states cannot solve global environmental problems
byacting alone, there is little point in one state changing its behaviour
without the assurance that others will too. On the contrary, game theory
can be used to show that it is rational for statesnottoco-operate (i.e. to
free-ride) if some other states are co-operating because the benefits of co-
operation, such as pollution prevention, will be secured anyway (Weale 1992 :
19 1).^1