The Politics of the Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy, 2nd Edition

Environmental philosophy

2.1 Defining value

1. Instrumental valueis the value which
   something hasfor someoneas ameans to
   an endwhich they desire. So, a word
   processor is valuable to me in so far as it
   enables me to write, when writing is
   something I want to do.


2. Inherent valueis the value something hasfor
   someone, but not as a means to a further
   end. A beautiful landscape has value for me,

but not because it enables me to do

something further. It is something which I

find valuable in itself.

3. Intrinsic valueis simply the value which
   something has. No appeal need be made to
   those for whom it has value. It simply is
   valuable and is so independently of anyone
   finding it valuable.

Intrinsic value:The value which something

has, independently of anyone finding it

valuable.

in the way key terms, such as instrumental, inher-
ent andintrinsic value,areused.The distinctions
between these terms are contested and key writ-
ers use them differently.^1 Ratherthan becoming
embroiled in arcane debates about these distinctions, the three definitions
used in this chapter are simply set out in Box2.1. These terms are not
mutually exclusive; being valuable in one way does not preclude something
also being valuable in another way.

◗ The anthropocentric--ecocentric divide

Why is value a key concept in environmental philosophy? A central tenet
of green thinking is the belief that the current ecological crisis is caused
byhuman arrogance towards the natural world, which legitimates its
exploitation in order to satisfy human interests. Human arrogance towards
nature is rooted inanthropocentrism:the belief that ethical principles apply
only to humans and that human needs and interests are of highest, perhaps
exclusive, significance – humans are placed at the centre of the universe,
separated from nature, and endowed with unique values (see Box2.2).
Anthropocentrism regards only humans as having intrinsic value, a claim
usually based on their capacity either to experience pleasure and pain
or to reason, and, furthermore, that only humans have interests. The
rest of nature is of instrumental value; it has value and deserves moral
consideration only in so far as it enhances human well-being. Non-human
nature – the koala bear or brown rat, the field of tulips or tract of wilder-
ness – is simply a ‘storehouse of resources’ for the satisfaction of human
ends (Eckersley 1992 : 26). An anthropocentric case for environmental pro-
tection will therefore be justified instrumentally in terms of the conse-
quences that pollution or resource depletion might have for human inter-
ests. Lead is removed from petrol because it harms human health and fishing
grounds are protected because of the threat to a vital economic and food
resource. Although there are many powerful instrumental arguments for
defending the environment, many greens believe that they are insufficiently