THEORY
Yetthe idea that someone might have reason to act because they are part
of a wider entity, which can itself flourish or perish, is not so strange. Many
people think that their well-being may depend partly upon the success of
agroup to which they belong, such as their nation, local community or
fellow workers. The crucialpoliticalquestion is membership. Even if holistic
arguments are admissible in principle, they will not serve green purposes
unless their proponents can show clearly that someone’s interests are related
to a widearrayofliving entities.
Secondly, a key feature of holism is that moral consideration is given to
whole categories (species, ecosystems) or ecological concepts (diversity, com-
plexity), rather than (or in addition to) individual entities, such as a human
being. Holistic accounts perceive the whole to be greater than the sum of
its parts: ‘Intrinsic value is a part in a whole and is not to be fragmented by
valuing it in isolation’ (Rolston 1991 : 95). Here, Naess and the ethical holists
draw on Aldo Leopold’s ( 1949 )‘land ethic’ thesis which holds that ‘a thing
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the
biotic community’ (pp. 224–5).^5 Large ‘wholes’, such as the biotic commu-
nity or ecosphere, are sufficiently organised and integrated to have a good of
their own and to possess intrinsic value. Thus, in holistic accounts, intrinsic
value resides in the general process, rather than the individual expressions,
of life (Taylor 1992 :114).
One objection to these arguments holds that a collective entity, such as
aspecies, cannot have intrinsic value because it does not have interests,
at least none over and above the sum of those of its individual members
(Attfield 1983 :150). Brennan ( 1986 )argues that these wholes are not even
wholes in their own right but mere aggregations of individuals. However,
even if we accept that a species cannot have interests, the view that the
possession of interests is not necessarily a condition for the possession of
intrinsic value – even if it is necessary for the attribution of rights – is quite
respectable in mainstream moral philosophy (Dworkin 1993 ).
Perhaps a more powerful criticism is Regan’s ( 1983 :361–2) charge that the
holistic focus on the whole species or biosphere is essentially ‘environmen-
tal fascism’ because it ignores or suppresses the rights of individual entities.
Eckersley ( 1992 : 60–1) suggests that this problem can be overcome through
the concept of ‘autopoiesis’, or self-renewal – the idea that all entities contin-
uously strive to reproduce their own organisational activity and structure –
which attributes value both to the collective whole (species, ecosystem) and
totheindividual organisms that make it up. Yet the task of producing an
ethical code of conduct based on autopoiesis would hardly be straightfor-
ward, not least because the idea that ‘wholes’ have value would have serious
implications in any conflict between the interests of the ecosystem and indi-
viduals within it. Suppose, for example, it was generally agreed that the
good of the biotic community (which would include humanity as a whole)
required an immediate reduction in human population to lessen pressure
on scarce resources. Would infanticide therefore be justified, or would the