THEORY
2.6 The Great Ape ProjectBased on a book by Cavalieri and Singer
(1993), the Great Ape Project seeks: ‘the
extension of the community of equals to
include all great apes: human beings,
chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and
orang-utans. The community of equals is the
moral community within which we accept
certain basic moral principles or rights as
governing our relations with each other and
enforceable in law’. Its key principles are:The Right to Life. Killing is justified only in
very strictly defined circumstances,
e.g. self-defence.The Protection of Individual Liberty.Noone must
be imprisoned without due legal process.
Unless a crime has been committed, a
creature is entitled to immediate release.
The Prohibition of Torture.Nodeliberate pain
may be inflicted on anyone.In June 2006 the Spanish Parliament
considered a proposal to give legal rights to
non-human great apes.
See http://www.greatapeproject.org.mice however they please. Whilst mice might not have interests or rights,
humans might still have a duty to treat them in certain ways.
Putting aside the above objection, if human suffering or well-being is
always given more weight, what practical benefits for animals flow from the
sentience thesis? According to Singer, quite a lot, as the requirement to stop
inflicting ‘unnecessary’ suffering on animals would result in radical changes
tohuman diets, farming methods, scientific experimental procedures, hunt-
ing, trapping and wearing of furs, and areas of entertainment like circuses,
rodeos and zoos (Singer 1979 : 53). The outcome of this dramatic change in
attitudes and behaviour would be a massive reduction in the quantity of
suffering.
Rights-based arguments have received particularly stern treatment from
traditional ethical theorists, notably because they seek to ascribe a liberal
principle, which was developed to fit uniquely human attributes, to animals.
Nash ( 1989 ), for example, suggests that extending rights to animals is simply
alogical progression of liberal ethical theory, which historically has gradu-
ally extended its reach to slaves, women, blacks and other excluded groups.
Critics counter that this argument founders on a faulty analogy between
humans and animals: to extend equal consideration to non-white humans
on the grounds of their common humanity (i.e. denying the relevance of
skin colour as an indicator of moral standing in society) is qualitatively dif-
ferent from arguments about our relationship with animals (Taylor 1992 :
60–1). Indeed, it might be regarded as offensive to compare the struggle for
animal rights with the women’s emancipation, civil rights and anti-slavery
movements. Clearly, an acceptance of Regan’s argument depends on the
persuasiveness of his ‘subject-in-a-life’ criterion as the basis for attributing
intrinsic value to some animals.
From a holistic perspective, animal liberationism does not go nearly
farenough and cannot alone provide the framework for a broad