THEORY
next chapter examines attempts to develop a broader political dimension to
ecologism.◗ Further reading
The collections edited by Gruen and Jamieson ( 1994 ), Elliot ( 1995 ), Botzler
and Armstrong ( 1998 ), Smith ( 1999 ), O’Neill et al. ( 2001 )andLight and Rol-
ston(2003), and the accessible textbook by Des Jardins ( 2002 ), all provide
good introductions to the sheer breadth and variety of environmental philo-
sophical writing. The Sessions ( 1995 )reader is a good introduction to deep
ecology; see also Devall and Sessions ( 1985 ) and Naess ( 1989 ). Fox ( 1990 )is,
arguably, the most sophisticated ecocentric analysis. Eckersley ( 1992 )offers
the best sympathetic survey of ecocentric writing. Good discussions of envi-
ronmental philosophy can be found in Hayward ( 1995 ), Barry (1999a), Dobson
(2000)andPratt et al. ( 2000 ). The journalsEnvironmental Ethics,Environmen-
tal ValuesandEnvironmental Politicsprovide a good coverage of contemporary
developments and debates.NOTES
1 Some writers use ‘extrinsic value’ in preference to ‘instrumental value’. Some use
either ‘inherent value’ or ‘intrinsic value’, but not both; others distinguish
‘inherent’ and ‘intrinsic’ value, but with little consistency in meaning. Intrinsic
value is a particularly tricky concept, with at least three different uses of the
term(O’Neill 1993 : 9).
2 Several typologies stake out a similar territory in environmental philosophy,
notably the shallow/deep ecology cleavage formulated by Arne Naess ( 1973 ).
3 Naess ( 1989 )later acknowledged that ‘ecosphere’ is a more accurate term than
‘biosphere’ to indicate that ‘life’ refers also ‘to things biologists may classify as
non-living: rivers, landscapes, cultures, ecosystems, ‘‘the living earth”’ (p. 29).
4 A common criticism of holistic arguments is that they commit the ‘naturalistic
fallacy’ of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, i.e. they shift from a description of the
waynature works (how it ‘is’) to a prescription for an ethical system (how we
‘ought’ to behave). Whilst a familiarity with scientific developments might inform
adebateabout ethics, it cannot in itself justify a philosophical or political
theory: ‘appealing to the authority of nature... is no substitute for ethical
argument’ (Eckersley 1992 : 59). See Taylor ( 1992 ), Lucardie ( 1993 )andHayward
(1995). For a defence from deep ecology, see Fox ( 1990 :188–93).
5 Barry (1999a:124–5) points out that this sentence is usually taken out of context
and that Leopold’s land ethic does not support a deep ecology perspective based
on the intrinsic value of nature.
6 The populist accusation that ecocentrics are misanthropic does them an injustice.
Ecocentrics object to human chauvinism, not to humans; they want humans and
human culture to blossom and flourish, alongside other species. Their emphasis
on the welfare of the non-human world is an attempt to correct an imbalance in
philosophical and social science theory (Eckersley 1992 : 56–7).