One would be laughed at for such a complaint in the case of an undeniably specialized system, say visual stereopsis
(perceiving depth fro mthe disparity of i mages in the two eyes). What makes a syste mspecialized is in part that it
performs processes not found elsewhere in the f-mind. If language is indeed a specialized system, one should expect
some of its functional principles to be sui generis.
Similarly, AndyClark (1996) wondershowmuchbrainspecializationis necessaryforlanguage. Theformal structureof
language provides part of the answer. Using language requires the ability to process syntactic and phonological
structures—two structures qualitatively different fro manything else in the brain—in the course of mapping between
thoughts and external signals. This seems to me to require a brain specialization of some sort, certainly more than
“some additional feedback loops”or the“freeingup of some resources”thanks to a larger cortex, as Clark speculates.
In particular, Clark asks whether language could be due just to“some small tweak”in brain architecture. I would
counter,“Small compared to what?”It's a small tweak compared to the differences between insects andfish, or to the
differentiationof the basic body plan. But then, so is themachinery in the bat's brain that permits echolocation, or the
machineryintheelephant'sbrainthatpermits ittouse itstrunk. IdoubtthatClark wouldattributeecholocationjustto
“some additional feedback loops”or the“freeing up of some resources.”As Chomsky (1975) and Pinker (1994b)
emphasize, there is no reason to view language any differently.
Part of the trouble is that Universal Grammar has often been construed—by both sides in the dispute—in terms of a
cartoonish“grammar box,”cut off fro mthe rest of the mind. This is clearly an oversi mplification. Tomasello and
Clark are correct to the extent that, insofar as possible, we should be conservativein how much linguistic structure we
ascribe to an innate UG. We should welcome explanations of linguistic universals on more general cognitive grounds.
For example, if there prove to be hierarchical structures and/or instantiation of variables elsewhere in perception,
cognition, and action (as argued in Chapter 3), we then need not ascribe these characteristics to a specifically linguistic
“toolkit.”This point is clearly prefigured inAspects(if only in a footnote):
Noticethatwedonot,ofcourse,implythatthefunctionsof languageacquisitionarecarriedoutbyentirelyseparate
components of the abstract mind or the physical brain.... In fact, it is an important problem for psychology to
determine to what extent other aspects of cognition share properties of language acquisition and language use, and
to attempt, in this way, to develop a richer and more comprehensive theory of mind. (Chomsky 1965): 207)On the other hand, even granted the broader applicability of hierarchical structure and variable instantiation, general
principles alone cannot explain the character of the specifically linguistic hierarchies and linguistic categories: the