begins the derivationof a sentence by generating a structure in the“base”component of syntax. The base consists of
twoparts:(a)thephrasestructurerules, whichcreateinitialsyntactictrees, and (b)theprincipleoflexical insertion, which
selects words out of the lexicon and puts the mat the botto mof the trees. The resulting structures, Deep Structures,
are the input to principles of semantic interpretation and also to the transformational rules that give rise to Surface
Structures. Thus all combinatoriality in language is ultimately the product of the phrase structure rules. The following
passages make this explicit:
The syntactic component specifies an infinite set of abstract formal objects, each of which incorporates all
information relevant to a single interpretation of a particular sentence. (Chomsky 1965: 16)
I assume throughout that the syntactic component contains a lexicon, and that each lexical item is specified in the
lexicon in terms of its intrinsic semantic features.... (p. 198, note to above passage)
I shall assume that no ambiguity is introduced by the rules of the base. (p. 17)
I a massu ming throughout that the se mantic co mponent of a generative gra m mar, like the phonological
component, is purely interpretive [i.e. all its structure is derived solely from syntactic structure—R.J.]. (p. 75)These passages also make clear that thisorganization is purely an assumption. AlthoughAspectsdoes argue that Deep
Structure is the syntactic level that determines semantic interpretation, it never offers an argument that syntax is the
only generative component, that is, the only component that explicitly gives rise to combinatoriality. And to my
knowledge, no argument has ever been offered since.
Incontext,thisassumptionis understandable.Theassertionthatsyntaxis generativewas oneofthemajorinnovations
of generative grammar, and the battle at the time was simply to establish thatsomethingis generative. Whether it is the
sole source of generativity was the last thing anybody needed to worry about. It seemed altogether plausible to view
phonology as a sort offinal adjustment to Surface Structure (as in Chomsky and Halle 1968), so phonology presented
no opportunitiesfor generativity. Furthermore, at the time virtually nothing was known within the generativetradition
about semantics, so it made sense to derive what little semantic structure there might be from the rich structural
possibilities emerging from the new syntactic technology.^48
The assumptionof syntactocentrismis preserved in every subsequentversion ofChomskyan theory. Fig. 5.1 illustrates
the major stages of architectural development fromAspectsto the Minimalist Program.
108 ARCHITECTURAL FOUNDATIONS
(^48) Still, fro mthe start there is a curious tension between stressing that language is the means for the free expression of thought, following the Cartesians, and formalizing
language in a way that seems to deny thought any independent status.